Category Archives: Policy

Patient, Consumer, and Public Health Coalition Letter to FDA Commissioner Califf Regarding FDA Advisory Committee Meetings

July 12, 2023


The Honorable Robert Califf, MD
Commissioner
Food and Drug Administration
10903 New Hampshire Ave.
Silver Springs, MD 20993

Dear Commissioner Califf,

As members of the Patient, Consumer, and Public Health Coalition, we appreciate your recent comments reaffirming your commitment to improving the format of Advisory Committees and look forward to working with you throughout these efforts. However, we also want to express our strong concerns when the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Center Directors publicly undermine or privately overrule the recommendations of their own scientists’ and statisticians’ regarding applications for accelerated approval and full approval.

At our meeting with you on March 1, you expressed your view that some nonprofit leaders and academic researchers were inaccurately and unfairly assuming that FDA Advisory Committee members were more knowledgeable than the FDA scientific reviewers who had spent months reviewing the data and other information provided by sponsors. What we have seen for several years, particularly in recent months, is that the FDA Advisory Committee members often agree with scientific and statistical concerns and conclusions expressed in the FDA scientific memoranda provided to them to review, and it is the Center Directors or other officials that are overriding the views of FDA scientific reviewers.

Below we have summarized a few recent examples where the FDA decision conflicted with FDA scientists and statisticians summaries that were provided to FDA Advisory Committee members and the public.

FDA staff who presented the data at the FDA Advisory Committee meeting on May 12 regarding the accelerated approval application for Sarepta’s gene therapy Elevidys made it very clear that they did not feel remotely confident that the benefits outweighed the risks for boys ages 4-7. For example, they stated that the surrogate endpoint for the drug is not “reasonably likely to predict clinical benefit” in support of accelerated approval. They also stated that although the data appeared to be more promising for boys ages 4-5, the post-hoc analysis could not be trusted. However, in his remarks, Center Director Peter Marks told the Advisory Committee that the FDA should show flexibility by granting approval. We consider this flexibility especially problematic because FDA had previously granted accelerated approval to three other Sarepta drugs, none of which have completed their confirmatory trials. In fact, the confirmatory trial for Exondys 51, which was approved in 2016, were due in November 2020 but instead was not even started until July 2020.[1]

Despite Dr. Marks’ persuasive remarks at the Advisory Committee meeting, members only narrowly voted (8-6) in favor of the gene therapy, and even those who voted in favor expressed numerous concerns about the data. It has been reported that Dr. Marks overruled the recommendations of all FDA staff when he granted accelerated approval to Elevidys, consistent with what was clear for all to see at the Advisory Committee meeting.[2] Sarepta immediately announced that the treatment would cost $3.2 million per patient. Meanwhile, Sarepta is charging up to $1 million per patient per year for Exondys 51 – approximately four times the cost the company estimated in 2016. In fact, Sarepta has so far earned a total of $2.5 billion in sales from Exondys 51 and the two other Duchenne drugs granted accelerated approval.[3]

Unfortunately, the unilateral decision by CBER Director Peter Marks to overrule his own staff is troubling and harmful to the reputation of the FDA, as was the similar decision by CDER Director Janet Woodcock regarding Exondys 51 in 2016. These are just two of numerous examples where FDA Center Directors have gone against the recommendations of its own scientists and advisors to grant approval for a drug when the safety and effectiveness were not consistent with FDA requirements for approval. Two other recent examples include the controversial approval of Aduhelm (initially for all Alzheimer’s patients although it was only tested on patients with mild cognitive impairment) and Relyvrio for the treatment of patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). These drugs will be marketed for years without confirmation of clinical benefit.

The June 28, 2023 Advisory Committee meeting regarding a drug for Fibrodysplasia ossificans progressive (FOP) is a somewhat different example. As was the case with Elevidys, the written memorandum by FDA staff expressed strong concerns about the scientific evidence: The primary end point was not met; the historical comparison sample was inappropriate; the data were manipulated post hoc in questionable ways; the nominal benefits were unreliable due to the wide confidence intervals; and there were increases in flare-ups – the very symptom that the drug was supposed to reduce. However, unlike the Elevidys meeting, the oral presentations by the FDA scientific and statistical staff were very obviously watered down versions of their written analyses. In fact, the main FDA presenter often seemed to be speaking on behalf of the sponsor, not the FDA. While still expressing concerns about whether the drug was safe and effective, the FDA speakers’ oral presentations contradicted the written FDA documents by stating that they were confident that the treatment probably had benefit and the risks of flare-ups were probably not so serious – an odd statement given that flare-ups were the outcome measure intended to be reduced by the treatment. Those statements were dramatically inconsistent with the written document summarizing the same analyses. This would have been worrisome but more justifiable for an accelerated approval, since the drug was intended to fulfill an unmet need for a terrible disease; however, the FDA meeting was considering full approval. FDA’s oral statements were so persuasive that several members of the Advisory Committee stated that the “FDA reassurances” convinced them that the benefits probably outweighed the risks, thus persuading them to vote in favor of the drug despite their strong reservations.

At an FDA Advisory Committee meeting in September 2022, FDA’s scientific summary of the confirmatory trials of PI3K inhibitor duvelisib (Copiktra) concluded that the risks outweigh the benefits for patients with chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL) or small lymphocytic lymphoma (SLL).  However, despite decreases in survival, the product retains its accelerated approval and FDA has not announced whether it intends to support those conclusions.

It is our understanding that FDA Advisory Committees are supposed to provide independent experts to review the FDA analyses, and not be unduly influenced by FDA staff or officials’ urging members how they should vote. Moreover, we agreed with your remarks on March 1 that FDA scientists and statisticians are the experts with the greatest knowledge of the data and the issues involved. It undermines the integrity of the FDA, the morale of FDA staff, and the public’s faith in FDA decisions when FDA officials grant an approval that contradicts its own scientists and statisticians. Equally important, overriding the scientific staff harms patients and contributes to a healthcare system that is financially unsustainable.

You have made it clear in numerous public statements that you are concerned about the format of Advisory Committee meetings, and we are as well. We urge you to speak out about the importance of FDA decisions supporting the FDA’s own scientific and statistical analyses. Please consider the following recommendations as you work to improve the format of the Advisory Committees:

  1. Provide training to FDA Advisory Committee members to help them understand the statistical analyses that are an essential part of all Advisory Committee meetings, and ensure they respect the importance of understanding and considering scientific evidence as part of their advisory role;
  2. Require that the FDA scientific and statistical staff who write the FDA memoranda for Advisory Committee meetings have the scientific freedom to express their own views, and that those views are accurately presented in FDA oral presentations at the meeting;
  3. Encourage Center Directors and other FDA officials attending Advisory Committee meetings to refrain from making comments that can be interpreted as encouraging committee members to vote a particular way; when FDA officials attend these meetings, their remarks should make it clear that FDA wants to hear their views and not to influence their votes.
  4. Remind Center Directors and other FDA officials that overruling the views of their own scientific and statistical staff undermines the public trust, and should be avoided, especially when the scientific staff are in consensus.

Sincerely,

American Medical Student Association Wisconsin

Breast Cancer Action

Doctors for America

Government Information Watch

Jacobs Institute of Women’s Health

Medical Device Problems

MISSD

Mothers Against Medical Error

MRSA Survivors Network

National Center for Health Research

National Women’s Health Network

Patient Safety Action Network

TMJ Association

USA Patient Network

Washington Advocates for Patient Safety

Woodymatters

 

 

1. ClinicalTrials.gov. A Study to Compare Safety and Efficacy of a High Dose of Eteplirsen in Participants With Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy (DMD) (MIS51ON). Available: https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT03992430.

2. Becker, Z. (2023). In approving Sarepta’s DMD gene therapy, FDA’s Peter Marks overruled reviewer’s rejection. Fierce Pharma. Retrieved from https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/fda-biologics-director-peter-marks-spearheaded-sareptas-dmd-gene-therapy-approval-overruled. Accessed July. 5, 2023.

3. Langreth, R., Rutherford, F., Milton, I., & Campbell, M. (2023). Sarepta’s gene therapy gets FDA accelerated approval: Are fast-tracked drugs safe? Benefits Pro. https://www.benefitspro.com/2023/05/19/sareptas-gene-therapy-gets-accelerated-approval-are-fda-fast-tracked-drugs-safe/?slreturn=20230530114553. Accessed July. 5, 2023.

Meeting of Patient, Consumer, and Public Health Coalition with Commissioner Califf and Key FDA Officials

March 1, 2023


Location: FDA White Oak Campus, Silver Spring, MD-Building 1, Great Room

FDA attendees: Robert Califf (Commissioner, virtual due to exposure to viruses), Peter Marks (Director, CBER, virtual), Owen Faris (OPEQ Principal Deputy Director, CDRH, virtual); In person: Julia Tierney (Chief of Staff, Office of the Commissioner), Jacqueline Corrigan-Curay, (Principal Deputy Director, CDER), Dayle Cristinizio (Director, Stakeholder Engagement, Office of External Affairs), Hilary Maston (Chief Medical Officer), Namandje Bumpus (Chief Scientist, AdCom responsibilities), Kaveeta Vasisht (Assoc Commissioner for Women’s Health), Jennifer Dooren (Director Communications and Public Engagement, Food Safety).

Coalition Attendees: In Person: Thomas Eagen (NCHR), Maria Gmitro (BISA), Denise Hyater-Lindenmuth (NWHN), Patricia Kelmar (U.S. PIRG), Suzanne Robotti (MedShadow), Kim Witczak (WoodyMatters), Diana Zuckerman (NCHR).  Virtual: Tahir Amin (I-MAK), Wendy Dolin (MISSD), Helen Haskell (MAME), Rex Johnson (WAPS), Katherine Leon (SCAD Alliance), Judy Norsigan (OBOS), Linda Radach (PSAN), Reshma Ramachandran (DFA), Brian Ronholm (Consumer Reports), Tess Schulman (Medical Device Problems), Robin Strongin (NCL), Dru West (USAPN), Sophia Phillips (on behalf of the Coalition).

On behalf of the Coalition members at the meeting, Dr. Diana Zuckerman offered our support to the Commissioner and the FDA, and thanked the Commissioner for his efforts to improve the Accelerated Approval program by requiring confirmatory trials be started prior to granting accelerated approval. Patricia Kelmar discussed members’ support for the FDA to regulate lab-developed tests to ensure their accuracy. Kim Witczak and Suzanne Robotti discussed possible improvements to the FDA Advisory Committee process, based on their perspectives as consumer representatives on two FDA Advisory Committees.  After the meeting was completed, Coalition members who were attending in person had informal discussions with several FDA officials.

Joint Letter from from Cancer Groups and Patient-Centered Nonprofits about VALID Act in Omnibus

December 16, 2022

The Honorable Patty Murray
Chair
Senate Health, Education, Labor & Pensions Committee
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Richard Burr
Ranking Member
Senate Health, Education, Labor & Pensions Committee
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Frank Pallone
Chair
House Energy & Commerce Committee
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Cathy McMorris Rodgers
Ranking Member
House Energy & Commerce Committee
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chair Murray, Ranking Member Burr, Chair Pallone, and Ranking Member Rodgers:

We are writing to express our strong support for your bipartisan support for the VALID Act earlier this year, and to urge you to include it in the Omnibus Spending bill with a few small improvements. Our concern is that women and men who are at high risk of breast cancer or other types of cancer are not currently able to have confidence that genetic tests used for screening and diagnosis are accurate. Our members were shocked to learn that the FDA only regulates diagnostic tests sold by companies, not those sold by laboratories. We have many examples of patients who have been terribly harmed when lab-developed diagnostic tests that were widely sold have been dangerously inaccurate. There are currently approximately 100,000 different lab developed tests that would be grandfathered under the current bill language, and none of them would be required to submit evidence now or in the future to prove that their tests are accurate. Even the highest risk lab developed tests that are currently being sold could continue to be sold without any restrictions, and it is unclear if serious adverse events caused by inaccurate tests would be reported to the FDA. That is unacceptable to us as patient-centered organizations.

Your constituents deserve better. In addition to the extensive grandfathering, the bill would categorize lab-developed tests as low, moderate, or high-risk. Low-risk would be essentially unregulated, moderate risk would  require some evidence but not be tested for accuracy (similar to the 510(k) review process). As you know, the 510(k) pathway is used to review approximately 95% of all medical devices, including most implanted devices, and it has been strongly criticized by physicians, patients, and public health experts because many of those devices are high risk, not moderate risk as the FDA claims.

As described in the current VALID provisions in the bill, only the highest risk devices would be required to provide clear evidence of accuracy, and the definition of high risk is unclear and based on the FDA’s track record is likely to exclude many tests that could cause irreparable harm, such as genetic tests that are used to inform people that they are at very high risk of breast cancer, ovarian cancer, stomach cancer, and other very serious diseases. Since many patients who are told that they tested positive for these genetic mutations have those important bodily organs surgically removed, those genetic tests should be considered high-risk. It would be equally tragic for a person to have an organ unnecessarily removed due to an inaccurate positive test result, or for a person to be incorrectly told they did not have a life-threatening genetic mutation, due to a false test negative result. Although we are focusing on breast cancer in this letter, it is well-known that most prenatal genetic testing is inaccurate, thus resulting in terminating wanted pregnancies because they were erroneously told their baby had a fatal birth defect. For that reason we strongly urge you to include genetic testing in the definition of “high risk” tests in the bill, and not allow grandfathering of high risk tests.

In addition to these shortcomings, we are concerned that academic medical centers are lobbying to be excluded from FDA regulation. While academic medical centers have an important role to play in U.S. healthcare, their tests are not monitored by the FDA, CMS, or any other independent entity to ensure they are accurate.  As a result, there are clear examples of tests that were dangerously inaccurate.  Any exemption for academic medical centers’ lab-developed tests should be extremely narrow, to target tests used for individuals, not for large numbers of patients.  High-risk tests should always be regulated.

In conclusion, we strongly recommend including an improved version of the VALID Act, as described above, in the Omnibus bill, in order to better protect patients and consumers from inaccurate and unreliable lab-developed tests.

Sincerely,

Breast Implant Safety Alliance

Cancer Prevention and Treatment Fund

National Women’s Health Network

Not Putting on a Shirt

Our Bodies Ourselves

Patient Safety Action Network

USA Patient Network

Washington Advocates for Patient Safety

WoodyMatters

 

Cc: Members of Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pension Committee and Members of Energy & Commerce Health Subcommittee

Testimony of Dr. Diana Zuckerman About I-omburtamab FDA Advisory Committee Meeting

October 28, 2022


I’m Dr. Diana Zuckerman, president of the National Center for Health Research. We scrutinize the safety and effectiveness of medical products, and we don’t accept funding from companies that make those products.  

My expertise is based on post-doc training in epidemiology and public health, my previous policy positions at Congressional Committees with oversight over FDA, my previous position at the US Department of Health and Human Services, and as a faculty member and researcher at Harvard and Yale. 

This is a terrible disease and the personal stories are very important.  What is the evidence that this treatment actually works?

The sponsor has provided data from 2 studies:

  1. A single center, single arm trial (Study 03-133) included 94 pediatric patients ages 0.9 to 13 years with CNS/LM relapsed neuroblastoma who received intracerebroventricular infusions.  Three doses were used: 25 mCi, 33.5 mCi, or 50 mCi, based on age. The Primary Endpoint was overall survival and the results showed 45% alive at 3 year.
  2. The second study is not completed yet.  The Interim report of this multi-center single arm study (Study 101) shows 20 patients with imaging evidence of CNS/LM disease.  The Sponsor reports 7 responders, but 3 of these are not confirmed.  That matters because transient responses are not necessarily meaningful, and therefore can’t be considered evidence.  The Primary Endpoint is 3-year overall survival, but those data are not yet available.

Safety

It is important to note that 19% of patients permanently discontinued using the drug due to an adverse reaction in Study 03-133 and 28% of patients in Study 101.  Most were due to myelosuppression.  However, 3% were due to chemical meningitis (3 cases in 03-133 and 1 case in Study 101), and there was one case of fatal intracranial hemorrhage

Shortcomings of the Studies

Only one study was completed and it wasn’t randomized or blinded or controlled.  The external control group was very small and they differed from the patients receiving the treatment, because the latter had more intensive prior treatment.  There were significant population differences as well as treatment differences between the treatment group and the external controls.  In addition, overall survival for this condition has improved since the control data sample was collected.

Therefore, we agree with FDA’s conclusion that differences in overall survival can’t be “reliably attributed” to the drug.  We also agree that “the application does not include reliable response rate data to provide supportive evidence.”

In Study 101, no patient demonstrated a response that can be unequivocally   attributed to the drug.  And there was no overall response rate calculated for Study 03-133  and only very limited overall response rate data in Study 101.

FDA has been the Gold Standard?  Do these data meet that standard?

The FDA Summary states: The comparator is too dissimilar to the treatment group.  There is no reliable information on tumor response rate.  Therefore, the submitted study cannot be considered an adequate and well-controlled trial necessary to establish effectiveness. That’s the standard that the law requires for FDA approval.

On the other hand, there is an unmet need. These children need treatment.  Should FDA be flexible even though the data are clearly inadequate?  Why isn’t this an accelerated approval application instead of a regular application? Are the data even good enough for accelerated approval?

Are FDA Decisions Perpetuating Poor Studies?

Why didn’t the sponsor conduct a randomized, double blind controlled trial?  This isn’t a rhetorical question.  What’s the incentive for any company to conduct a well-designed study if a poorly conducted study with questionable findings results in approval?  Those controversial decisions set a dangerous precedent.

Unfortunately, when FDA approves a drug based on inadequate data, all companies lose the incentive to conduct well-designed studies.  Not just the company whose product is approved, but all other companies as well.

Patients Deserve Better

We do patients and their families no favors by approving treatments that aren’t proven to work. 

FDA’s Expanded access program is the way to give patients access to experimental drugs, because it provides free treatments in a well monitored situation where the patients and families know that they are taking a risk using an experimental drug.  Why should patients pay to take an experimental drug, thinking it is proven safe because it is FDA approved?

I can’t believe I have to say this: Without an appropriate control group, it is not possible to provide evidence that patients and doctors need to make informed decisions.  Even a small study with a small well matched control group is better than nothing.

Unfortunately, the preponderance of evidence doesn’t support approval for this drug.

The Advisory Committee agreed with our assessment and voted 16-0 that the studies did not prove the drug improved overall survival. The FDA subsequently rejected the application.

NCHR Testimony at FDA Advisory Panel on Wound Dressings

October 26, 2022


I’m Dr. Diana Zuckerman, president of the National Center for Health Research. We scrutinize the safety and effectiveness of medical products, and we don’t accept funding from companies that make those products. So I have no conflicts of interest. 

My expertise is based on post-doctoral training in epidemiology and public health, my previous policy positions at Congressional Committees with oversight over FDA, my previous position at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and as a faculty member and researcher at Harvard and Yale. 

There are unique issues for the different types of wound dressings you are considering today, but they have some issues in common:

  1. They have been treated as 510k devices despite not being categorized as Class II or any other Class
  2. They have been used for years but FDA found very few studies pertaining to safety or effectiveness, and some were specific to particular types of surgery, such as diabetic foot ulcer care.  
  3. The information from FDA’s AEs reporting on the MDR system is  limited but the FDA has identified several potentially serious AEs, including toxicity, infections, and delays in wound healing.  These are important because they clearly can interfere with the success of surgery. 
  4. Most patients and surgeons assume that these products are proven safe and effective.  They would be surprised to know how little scientific evidence there is regarding safety and effectiveness.

You heard testimony from Madris Kinard from Device Events this morning, and saw her excellent analyses of adverse events based on information from the FDA database.  At our request, she also provided an analysis of wound dressings to our research center, based on the FDA total product life cycle database.  The results indicated thousands of reports of contamination and problems with non-sterile packaging of wound devices on the FDA.  Most were from the last 4 years. For the animal derived wound dressings, which are collagen dressings, there are 126 MDRs and 12 recalls.

FDA and other experts agree that MDRs are under-reported. It is a voluntary system, and as panel members mentioned this morning, it is difficult to distinguish between adverse events caused by the device vs. the procedure.  We all know that surgeons are very busy and do not strong incentives to report adverse events if the causes are unclear.  Keep in mind, for example, if a patient’s wound becomes infected, surgeons would not necessarily report it as an MDR for the wound dressing.

The FDA has delineated some very clear special controls for these devices if they are considered Class II and continue to be cleared through the 510k process.  These are good efforts that would improve upon the current regulatory policies for these devices.

But the special controls have 2 major shortcomings:

#1: They don’t include inspections, which could reduce harm caused by contamination and non-sterile packaging.

#2:  None of those controls will provide scientific data on the safety and effectiveness of any of these wound dressing products.   And that is the one crucial type of information that is missing. Insufficient information is currently available, especially regarding which specific products are safest and most effective for which indications.  The issue isn’t just different types of wound dressings, but the products made by different companies.  It is likely that some are better than others.  That is why I encourage you to urge the FDA to categorize wound dressings as Class III, so that we will finally have well designed clinical trials to determine safety and effectiveness. 

What about registries?  Registries can collect important information.  But as you consider all the medical devices being discussed today and tomorrow,  please remember that registries are controlled by medical societies and as such the data from them are not available to the public or the FDA, except for the information that those medical societies choose to make public.  So unfortunately, we can’t rely on registries to provide objective, comprehensive information about safety or effectiveness to the FDA or the public.

Comment of the National Center for Health Research Submitted to the EPA on the Designation of PFOA and PFOS as CERCLA Hazardous Substances, October 6, 2022

October 6, 2022

The National Center for Health Research appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the designation of PFOA and PFOS as CERCLA hazardous substances. We are a public health think tank that conducts research, scrutinizes research conducted by others, and determines how research findings can be used to improve health policies and explains what is known and not known about the risks and benefits of specific products, programs, and policies.

For several years, we have been actively engaged in the study of the impact of PFOA, PFOS, and other PFAS chemicals on human health. There is clear evidence that these chemicals can disrupt the endocrine system in humans even at low levels.  Exposure can exacerbate such common conditions as obesity, early puberty, attention disorders, and eventually cause cancer.  We are therefore writing in strong support of the designation of PFOA and PFOS as CERCLA hazardous substances. This is an important first step because it holds companies accountable for these toxic substances, which in turn will improve public health.

Unfortunately, detailed information is lacking on most of the thousands of compounds that comprise PFAS.  Since it is unlikely that EPA can compile comprehensive toxicity data on all members of this class of chemicals, EPA should make it an urgent priority to work with independent researchers and other federal agencies to develop a common definition of PFAS, and ensure that researchers and regulatory agencies assess and restrict these chemicals as a class. PFAS classes should be determined based on exposure data, chemicals that are located or utilized together, and other parameters such as structure. Known hazards in well-studied compounds should be assumed to extrapolate to similar compounds that lack good data, until research is conducted to fill those data gaps.

In conclusion, the National Center for Health Research agrees that the designation of PFOA and PFOS as CERCLA hazardous substances is consistent with the clear evidence that these chemicals disrupt the endocrine system, accumulate in the environment and in the human body, and can cause serious health problems for humans and other animals.  Since there are thousands of other chemicals with similar structures that are not yet regulated, despite the assumption that they can cause similar harm, we strongly urge the EPA to regulate PFAS as a class of chemicals for the protection of public health and our environment.

For additional information about our work in this area, contact info@center4research.org.

Testimony of Diana Zuckerman at the Meeting of EPA’s National Environmental Justice Advisory Council on September 28, 2022

I’m Dr. Diana Zuckerman, president of the National Center for Health Research. We scrutinize the safety and effectiveness of medical and consumer products, and we don’t accept funding from companies that make those products.  Our largest program is focused on cancer prevention and treatment.  My expertise is based on post-doc training in epidemiology and public health, and my previous positions at HHS and as a faculty member and researcher at Harvard and Yale.

 Thank you all for the important work you’ve been doing and will be doing on this Advisory Council.  As a public health person, I’ve always been surprised at the lack of other public health advocates who are active on environmental issues and environmental justice issues, and I want to offer to be helpful in any way that would be useful to all of you.  We all know that lives are at stake.

I want to comment very briefly on the PFAS recommendations, since that’s an issue we’ve worked on for years.  Let me add that we are very concerned about all endocrine disrupting chemicals not just PFAS.

Everything I heard about PFAS this afternoon was inspiring and important.  I would just suggest that it’s a huge task, and I encourage you to start a little smaller in order to succeed in educating the public and especially environmental justice communities and at the same time focus on actions that are doable, that will inspire others, and that will make change happen.

Testimony of Dr. Diana Zuckerman About COPIKTRA FDA Advisory Committee Meeting on September 23, 2022

I’m Dr. Diana Zuckerman, president of the National Center for Health Research. We scrutinize the safety and effectiveness of medical products, and we don’t accept funding from companies that make those products. Our largest program is focused on cancer. My expertise is based on post-doc training in epidemiology and public health, and my previous positions at HHS and as a faculty member and researcher at Harvard and Yale.

In April this same Committee examined 6 randomized trials of Pi3K inhibitors used for hematologic malignancies and found that all reduced overall survival –despite potential benefit for PFS. FDA says that these consistent findings across multiple randomized trials within the same drug class is unprecedented in oncology.
That’s a shocking finding that we need to take seriously. And that’s the context for today’s meeting.

The sponsor did a 5-year randomized controlled post-market study – 3 years longer than the data that resulted in initial approval. They found the median OS was 11 months shorter than the comparison drug. In fact, 50% of the patients died during those 5 years, compared to 44% taking the other treatment – a treatment that is no longer considered effective and so is rarely used.

Then they analyzed patients with 2 or more prior therapies, since that was the indication. Those Copiktra patients lived about 3 months shorter – not as bad as the larger sample, but still worrisome. Especially since 56% died during the 5 years of the study, compared to 49% assigned to the other treatment.

Adverse events caused the deaths of 15% of the Copiktra patients compared to only 3% of the other treatment group. And the percentage of Grade 3 or greater AEs was 91%, and 78% had Serious AEs–about twice as high as the comparison group. This has clear implications for quality of life, in addition to the patients not living as long.

The FDA did the right thing by requesting this post-market study. And the sponsor did the right thing by completing the study. Now is the time to listen to the results. We urge this Advisory Committee and the FDA to make it clear that approvals will be rescinded when evidence indicates that promising short-term results are reversed based on longer term data from post-market studies.

Patients and oncologists want as many treatment options as possible, but we do patients no favors by maintaining approval for a drug that does more harm than good. As was true yesterday for other cancer treatments, the preponderance of evidence is clear today.

As a cancer survivor myself, I understand the need for treatment options. I thank this committee and the FDA for its objective, scientific analysis of the data presented yesterday and today. I hope it will help everyone understand that an individual patient may seem to do well on a specific treatment, but that treatment may not be the REASON the patient did well. There are other individual differences that cause some patients to do better than others, and to live longer than others. As FDA stated, these diseases are often indolent. That’s why large, long-term randomized controlled trials are so important – to help us understand which treatments are better for which patients.

There are so many problems with the data, including the very substantial changes in treatment standards that have occurred since this study was designed, the low number of US patients, and the dearth of nonwhite patients – all these support rescinding approval for this indication.

It takes years for FDA to rescind approval unless the sponsor does the right thing by voluntarily doing so. But your vote today will be very influential.

I hope that the sponsor will conduct new research to determine if a subgroup of patients can benefit from this drug under current treatment standards, and if a lower dose is safer as well as effective, and if so FDA should of course consider approval for a different indication. But that isn’t where we are today.

Testimony of Dr. Diana Zuckerman About PEPAXTO FDA Advisory Committee Meeting on September 22, 2022

I’m Dr. Diana Zuckerman, president of the National Center for Health Research. We scrutinize the safety and effectiveness of medical products, and we don’t accept funding from companies that make those products.  Our largest program is focused on cancer.  My expertise is based on post-doc training in epidemiology and public health, and previous positions at HHS and faculty member and researcher at Yale and Harvard.

All of us want more treatment options for refractory cancers, but we want patients to be able to have confidence that FDA approval means a product is proven safe and effective.  The OCEAN study of 495 multiple myeloma patients has important information that was not available when the drug received accelerated approval. Even if some patients taking Pepaxto do well, it is only with a randomized controlled trial that we can determine if Pepaxto is helpful or if the patients would do better without it.

Our Center’s analyses support the FDA findings that the data do not confirm the indication.  In the randomized trial comparing Pepaxto to another treatment option, median survival was 5.3 months shorter, and the death rate was slightly higher.

The Sponsor says some patients do better but we agree with FDA that “Results from subgroup analyses cannot be used to conclude benefit in a subset of patients, when the overall patient population has shown a detrimental treatment effect.”

We also agree with the FDA that PFS is not improved and that “An anti-cancer therapy that prolongs PFS is not considered safe and effective if the therapy results in a detrimental effect on OS”

Public trust in the FDA has been weakened in recent years.  FDA standards matter to all of us.  Would you want your loved one to take Pepaxto rather than a superior treatment option?  Not all oncologists will be as knowledgeable about the data as those serving on this panel.

It concerns us that the sponsor continues to ignore FDA concerns, rely on shortcuts instead of better research, and that the company withdrew the drug in October but then rescinded the withdrawal.  Was this just a delaying tactic?  We agree with the FDA that the sponsor did not provide new data, and with Dr. Pazdur that FDA approval relies on solid information about appropriate dosage, which is lacking here.

Maybe Pepaxto would benefit some types of patients and better research is needed to prove that.  As FDA states, the preponderance of evidence from the prespecified analysis and in all other subgroups suggests an increased risk of death in patients and a potential for harm.”

We were pleased that the Committee voted 14-2 that the evidence does not support that the benefits outweigh the risks.

The FDA followed through and rescinded Pepaxto approval in December, 2022.

Joint Letter to Support FDA Proposed Rule Reducing Nicotine Levels in Cigarettes

September 12, 2022

Dr. Robert Califf
Commissioner
U.S. Food and Drug Administration
10903 New Hampshire Avenue
Silver Spring, MD 20993

Re: Nicotine Standard

Dear Dr. Califf:

The undersigned public health, medical and professional organizations write in strong support of your recent announcement that FDA will issue a proposed rule to reduce the nicotine level in cigarettes to non-addictive or minimally addictive levels. Such a standard would generate massive public health benefits, preventing millions of young people from smoking and dramatically reducing the number of people who die from tobacco-caused diseases. We urge you to move forward with this proposal as quickly as possible.

Despite great progress in curbing smoking prevalence in recent years, tobacco use – primarily smoking – remains the leading cause of preventable death and disease in the United States, killing more than 480,000 Americans every year.1 Sixteen million Americans are currently living with a tobacco-caused disease.2 Over 30 million Americans currently smoke, and every day over 1,600 kids try their first cigarette.3 Approximately half of people who smoke will die prematurely as a result of their addiction, losing at least a decade of life on average compared to those who do not smoke.4

We applaud the Administration for taking action to reduce tobacco use as part of its Cancer Moonshot initiative.5 Cigarette smoking causes about 30 percent of all cancer deaths in the U.S.6 Reductions in tobacco use have already had an impact on cancer rates. According to CDC, 60 percent of the decrease in cancer death rates among men and 40 percent of the decrease among women from their peak in 1990 to 1991 until 2014 were due to declines in tobacco-related cancer deaths.7 More progress can be made and reducing nicotine levels will have a profound impact.

Nicotine is the primary addictive agent in cigarettes and other tobacco products. According to the U.S. Surgeon General, “the addiction caused by the nicotine in tobacco smoke is critical in the transition of smokers from experimentation to sustained smoking and, subsequently, in the maintenance of smoking for the majority of smokers who want to quit.”8 Thus, reducing the nicotine content in cigarettes to non-addictive or minimally addictive levels will prevent experimentation by the young from becoming a lifetime of addiction and tobacco-caused disease. It also will reduce the level of nicotine dependence in adults who smoke, making it easier for them to quit.

Current evidence establishes the potentially historic lifesaving impact of reducing nicotine content in cigarettes to non-addictive or minimally addictive levels. As you know, FDA estimated in 2018 that approximately 5 million additional adults who smoke could quit smoking within one year of implementation and, by the year 2100, more than 33 million people – mostly youth and young adults – would have avoided becoming regular smokers. Smoking rates could drop to as low as 1.4 percent, resulting in more than 8 million fewer tobacco-caused deaths through the end of the century.9 The dimensions of this public health benefit make timely implementation of this policy a moral imperative.

Reducing nicotine levels in cigarettes to achieve these enormous public health gains is technologically feasible. As FDA noted in its earlier Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM), there are a wide range of available technologies to reduce nicotine in cigarettes, including “through tobacco blending and cross-breeding plants, genetic engineering, and chemical extraction.”10 Indeed, the tobacco industry’s own documents show that the industry has a long history of manipulating nicotine levels in cigarettes to make them more addictive. As U.S. District Court Judge Gladys Kessler determined in her landmark opinion finding that the major cigarette companies had violated the federal anti-racketeering statute, “Defendants have designed their cigarettes to precisely control nicotine delivery levels and provide doses of nicotine sufficient to create and sustain addiction.”11 Surely the companies cannot now credibly maintain that they are unable to reduce nicotine levels to no longer sustain addiction. In addition, FDA has noted that recent scientific studies do not support concerns that nicotine reduction would cause people who smoke to compensate by increasing the number of cigarettes smoked or inhaling more deeply to increase nicotine intake. Studies of very low nicotine cigarettes have not found evidence of compensatory smoking but have found demonstrable reductions in cigarettes smoked per day and in exposure to harmful smoking constituents.12

To realize the full potential public health benefits of a nicotine product standard, FDA must extend that standard beyond cigarettes, to other combustible tobacco products. Exempting other combustible products would invite tobacco manufacturers to market existing, or develop new, non-cigarette substitutes, like the small, flavored cigars the industry introduced after flavored cigarettes (except menthol) were removed from the market. It also would make the exempted products a potential vehicle for youth initiation. Thus, we urge FDA to make any nicotine reduction product standard applicable to other combustible tobacco products.

Reducing nicotine in cigarettes and other combusted tobacco products will complement FDA’s proposed rules to prohibit menthol cigarettes and flavored cigars. By addressing flavors and nicotine levels, FDA will be able to target both what attracts youth to these products and what addicts them. FDA should continue its work to promptly finalize and implement the menthol cigarette and flavored cigar proposed rules. Moreover, FDA should continue to address high rates of e-cigarette use by youth by promptly completing statutorily required premarket reviews and removing from the market those products that are not “appropriate for the protection of the public health.”

Reducing the nicotine content in cigarettes and other combustible tobacco products will dramatically reduce addiction, disease, and premature death from tobacco. We applaud FDA for setting forth a bold plan to protect kids and public health and urge the agency to act quickly to complete the rulemaking process. Every day that passes means more kids moving from experimentation to addiction and more adults who want to quit, and try to quit, but remain addicted to a lethal product.

Respectfully submitted,

AASA, The School Superintendents Association
Academy of General Dentistry
Action on Smoking and Health
Allergy & Asthma Network
Alpha-1 Foundation
American Academy of Family Physicians
American Academy of Oral and Maxillofacial Pathology
American Association for Cancer Research
American Association for Dental, Oral, and Craniofacial Research
American Association for Respiratory Care
American Cancer Society Cancer Action Network
American College of Cardiology
American College of Physicians
American Dental Association
American Heart Association
American Public Health Association
American Society of Addiction Medicine
Americans for Nonsmokers’ Rights
Association for Clinical Oncology
Association for the Treatment of Tobacco Use & Dependence
Association of Black Cardiologists
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials
Asthma and Allergy Foundation of America
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids
Cancer Prevention and Treatment Fund
Catholic Health Association of the United States
Center For Black Equity
Children’s Health Fund
Commissioned Officers Association of the USPHS
Common Sense Media
Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America (CADCA)
COPD Foundation
Counter Tools
Dana-Farber Cancer Institute
Emphysema Foundation of America
Family, Career and Community Leaders of America (FCCLA)
First Focus on Children
GLMA: Health Professionals Advancing
LGBTQ+ Equality
GO2 Foundation for Lung Cancer
HealthHIV
International Association for the Study of Lung Cancer
Kaiser Permanente
March of Dimes
National Alliance to Advance Adolescent Health
National Association of Hispanic Nurses
National Association of Pediatric Nurse Practitioners
National Association of School Nurses
National Association of Secondary School Principals
National Black Church Initiative
National Black Nurses Association
National Education Association
National Hispanic Medical Association
National LGBT Cancer Network
National Medical Association
National Native Network
National Network of Public Health Institutes
National Tongan American Society
North American Quitline Consortium
Oncology Nursing Society
Parents Against Vaping e-cigarettes (PAVe)
Preventing Tobacco Addiction
Foundation/Tobacco 21
Preventive Cardiovascular Nurses Association
Respiratory Health Association
SADD
Society for Cardiovascular Angiography & Interventions
The Center for Black Health and Equity
The Society for State Leaders of Health
and Physical Education
The Society of Thoracic Surgeons
Trust for America’s Health
Truth Initiative
US COPD Coalition

CC: Dr. Brian King, Director of the Center for Tobacco Products

1. HHS, The Health Consequences of Smoking – 50 Years of Progress: A Report of the Surgeon General, 2014 (2014 SG Report).
2. Id.
3. CDC, “Tobacco Product Use Among Adults—United States, 2020,” MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep
2022;71:397–405, March 18, 2022, https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/71/wr/mm7111a1.htms_cid=mm7111a1_w. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), HHS, Results from the 2019 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, NSDUH: Detailed Tables, Table 4.9A https://www.samhsa.gov/data/report/2019-nsduh-detailed-tables
4. 2014 SG Report
5. The White House, “President Biden Reignites Cancer Moonshot to End Cancer as We Know It,” Fact Sheet. February, 2, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/02/fact-sheet-president-
biden-reignites-cancer-moonshot-to-end-cancer-as-we-know-it/
6. American Cancer Society. Cancer Facts & Figures 2022. Atlanta: American Cancer Society, 2022.
https://www.cancer.org/research/cancer-facts-statistics/all-cancer-facts-figures/cancer-facts-figures-2022.html
7. CDC, “Vital Signs: Disparities in Tobacco-Related Cancer Incidence and Mortality—United States, 2004-2013,” MMWR 65(44): 1212-1218, https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/wr/pdfs/mm6544a3.pdf/.
8. 2014 SG Report.
9. Apelberg, BJ, et al., “Potential Public Health Effects of Reducing Nicotine Levels in Cigarettes in the United States,” New England Journal of Medicine, published online March 15, 2018. See also, “Tobacco Product Standard for Nicotine Level of Combusted Cigarettes,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 83 Fed. Reg. 11818, 11820 (March 16, 2018)(ANPRM)
10. ANPRM, at 11820.
11. U.S. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 449 F.Supp. 2d, 1, 309 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d in relevant part. 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir.2009).
12. ANPRM, at 11820.