Category Archives: Policy

Chantix citizen petition

October 8, 2014

Margaret A. Hamburg
Commissioner
Food and Drug Administration

through

Division of Dockets Management
Food and Drug Administration
Department of Health and Human Services
5630 Fishers Lane, Room 1061
Rockville, MD 20852

Citizen Petition

Five leading nonprofit consumer, research and medical organizations identified below petition the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) pursuant to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 21 USC 352, 505(o)(4), and 21 CFR 10.30 to take action to improve the safety information included in the label for CHANTIX® (varenicline) tablets , a smoking cessation aid approved under NDA 021-928.

The petitioners are the Institute for Safe Medication Practices, a nonprofit organization devoted entirely to medication error prevention and safe medication use; Consumer Reports, which serves consumers through unbiased product testing and ratings, research, public education and advocacy; National Center for Health Research, a nonprofit think tank that scrutinizes scientific and medical research with public health implications; National Physicians Alliance, a non-profit organization that promotes health and fosters physicians’ active engagement with their communities to achieve high quality affordable health care for all; and Public Citizen, a consumer advocacy organization with more than 350,000 members and supporters.

Action Requested
The petitioners request that FDA amend the Boxed Warning and Indications sections of the label for CHANTIX® (varenicline) Tablets [1] to reflect new scientific information that has become available since the agency required a Boxed Warning in July 2009. We request specifically the following:
Clarify and expand the scope of reported serious neuropsychiatric adverse effects in the Highlights and main Boxed Warning to include the full spectrum of events now known: suicidal behavior, aggression/violence, psychosis, and depression.

Add language to the Boxed Warnings describing the risk of blackouts, convulsions, and impaired vision, adverse effects that could also endanger others in some settings such as operating aircraft, driving ambulances or large trucks.

Add to the Indications section restrictions against use in persons in sensitive or hazardous occupations such as pilots, air traffic controllers, military missile crews, police, fire fighters, and emergency medical workers. Existing actions by the FAA, the Department of Transportation, and the Department of Defense should be expanded by a clear and uniform label restriction that would include non-federal workers.

Remove inappropriate promotional material about CHANTIX benefits from paragraph 3 of the Highlights section Boxed Warning. A survey of Boxed Warnings for 10 classes of drugs showed no other Boxed Warning containing extraneous promotional statements about benefit.

Delete recently-approved but misleading description of meta-analyses about the neuropsychiatric adverse effects of CHANTIX from the Warnings and Precautions section.

B. Grounds
Compelling Scientific Evidence
The scientific evidence that CHANTIX (varenicline tartrate) increases the likelihood of suicidal thoughts and behavior, aggression/violence, psychosis, accidents, and depression is compelling and thoroughly documented. The adverse effects can be catastrophic, resulting in death, disability, and disruption of marriage, family relationships, and jobs. Severe symptoms can begin with the first doses even before stopping smoking, and many resolve soon after treatment is stopped. In some cases, symptoms reappear if treatment is resumed. The adverse effects of CHANTIX have been documented in three special studies by the FDA Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology (OSE),[2–4] by six studies in the peer reviewed literature,[5–10] and six reviews in QuarterWatch, a scientific publication about adverse drug events.[11–16] Psychiatric adverse effects of CHANTIX have also been observed worldwide and publicly reported in Canada,[17] France,[9] New Zealand,[5] and Australia.[18] The psychiatric adverse effects of CHANTIX have been reported to the FDA steadily and continuously over the eight years since the drug was approved, and have been roughly proportional to patient exposure.[14,16]

Why Clear Warnings Are Essential
Prominent warnings about the psychiatric and other adverse effects of CHANTIX provide important safety benefits to patients and the public. In many cases symptoms appear early, often in the first week, before stopping smoking. Effective patient and physician warnings to stop treatment immediately can prevent tragic events such as suicide and assault. In addition, two kinds of CHANTIX adverse effects—aggression/violence and impaired consciousness/vision—can and have caused injury to others. The highest public health duty to warn involves emphasizing potential serious harm to innocent persons that can be prevented with early and appropriate action.
An Estimated 2,500 CHANTIX Victims Compensated
An exhaustive scientific evaluation of CHANTIX took place over four years in United States District Court, and involved thousands of cases of alleged injury caused by CHANTIX. Millions of pages of scientific data, analysis, and other records were available under seal to batteries of qualified scientific experts representing both the victims and the manufacturer. This mass of evidence was distilled into expert reports that were subject to rigorous legal criteria monitored by a federal judge to ensure that the judgments therein were reliable and met accepted scientific standards. The result of this exhaustive process was that Pfizer, the manufacturer, paid approximately $300 million in damages to an estimated 2,500 CHANTIX victims.[19] Thousands of other CHANTIX victims were not eligible for compensation because the judge barred payment if the injuries occurred after the July 2009 Boxed Warning.

The Need to Update 2009 Warnings
It is important for the FDA to revisit the Boxed Warnings because its 2008 assessments, through no fault of the agency, substantially underestimated the psychiatric adverse effects and accident risks of CHANTIX. It was not until July 2010 that the FDA learned that Pfizer had failed to properly submit 26,000 adverse event reports, including 589 serious cases, 150 completed suicides, 102 cases of hostility/aggression, and 56 cases of psychosis.[15] In addition, later peer reviewed studies provide important new insights into CHANTIX cases involving aggression/violence, as well as comparisons with other smoking cessation treatments.

Information Adverse to Petition
21 CFR 10.30 requires citizen petitioners to consider and report information adverse to the petition request. Safety concerns have contributed to a 73% decline in CHANTIX patient exposure since 2008, lessening its use in smoking cessation treatment.[16] Clearer warnings might further reduce smoking cessation treatment using CHANTIX. However, safer alternatives of approximately comparable long-term effectiveness are available.

The two Pfizer-sponsored meta-analyses of its clinical trials that were recently added to the product label did not identify psychiatric adverse effects described in the current or proposed expanded Boxed Warning.[1] However, the clinical trials included in the meta analyses were inadequate in methodological design, including patient selection, adverse event ascertainment, and statistical power, to identify the infrequent but serious psychiatric adverse effects now known.

The FDA also conducted an observational study in electronic health records of the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs. It reported no difference in the rate of psychiatric hospitalization in the first 60 days after initiating treatment with CHANTIX or the nicotine patch.[20,21] However, those studies can not be considered conclusive because neither the underlying diagnosis codes nor the hospitalization endpoint was validated for regulatory purposes or previously used in a peer reviewed publication. In addition, the psychiatric hospitalization endpoint omits the 85% of reported psychiatric adverse events that do not result in hospitalization.[22] Additional studies and analysis on this topic appear in the Detailed scientific documentation section of this document.

Environmental Impact
Granting the actions requested in this petition would have no identifiable environmental impact.
Economic impact
The economic impact of this petition cannot be determined in absence of adequate data to assess the costs of reduced injuries resulting from more effective and accurate safety warnings.
Certification
Signature pages and certification appear at the end of this petition.

F. Detailed Scientific Documentation
Part 1: Four Psychiatric Adverse Effects of CHANTIX: the Evidence
Part 2: Impairment in Sensitive/Hazardous Occupations
Part 3: Inappropriate Promotional Material in Boxed Warning
Part 4: Meta-Analysis and Observational Studies
Part 5: References

Section F: Detailed Scientific Documentation
Part 1: Four Psychiatric Adverse Effects of CHANTIX: the Evidence
The psychiatric adverse effects of CHANTIX fall into these four psychiatric diagnostic categories: suicidal behavior, aggression/violence, psychosis, and depression. The primary scientific evidence in this section is shown in Table 1.

Many CHANTIX psychiatric episodes share distinctive features and overlap these four analytical categories: An episode of paranoia may lead to or involve violence. Aggression and rage are rechanneled and result in self-harm. Depression may lead to suicidal behavior. Sleep disturbances may border on exceptionally vivid dreams that resemble psychotic hallucinations. Sleep disruptions have erupted in violence.
This analysis focuses on the most clearly researched common features that include early onset, often before stopping smoking; remission on discontinuation; a senseless act in patients with no previous psychiatric history; and rechallenge, the reappearance of symptoms if the medication is restarted. There is less published scientific information available for two additional subsets of psychiatric cases: a) Cases that begin on discontinuation; b) Cases where the adverse effects are persistent. These cases require further research.

Suicidal Behaviors
Suicidal and self-injurious thoughts and acts are a prominent and established side effect of many therapeutic drugs, with at least 58 drugs currently carrying some form of warning on the product labels.[10] For CHANTIX, suicidal ideation, attempted suicide, and completed suicide carry the most prominent label warning language and have been documented through multiple sources. The 2008 FDA OSE Suicidal Behavior Study of adverse event data [3] had only limited cases available but concluded:
“The AERS data suggest a possible association between suicidal events and use of varenicline and bupropion, given that there were postmarketing cases of positive dechallenge/rechallenge, close temporal relationship between the event and drug use, and the occurrence of suicidal events in patients without any psychiatric history.”
This report was a primary source in the FDA decision to mandate a boxed warning in 2009.

A peer-reviewed survey of British adverse event data found a disproportionate number of cases of suicidal behaviors for CHANTIX, notably fewer cases for bupropion, and few or none for nicotine replacement products. For completed suicides, for example, there were 22 reported for CHANTIX, 6 reported for bupropion, and none for nicotine products. For suicidal ideation, there were 377 cases reported for CHANTIX, 131 for bupropion for all indications, and 2 for nicotine.[8] Exposure to nicotine replacement products was 7 times larger than varenicline, but bupropion exposure for smoking cessation could not be assessed because of its multiple indications.

A larger and more formal disproportionality analysis reported similar results in a peer-reviewed study.[10] When CHANTIX was compared to nicotine replacement products for suicidal/self injury, the odds ratio (OR) was 8.4, (95% CI 6.8-10.4). For CHANTIX compared to bupropion the results were: OR = 2.9 (95% CI 2.3-3.7). The large number of CHANTIX reported cases also adds scientific weight to the findings. In the Suicidality/Depression in Smoking Cessation study, CHANTIX accounted for 1,818 reported cases of suicidal thoughts or behavior compared to just 50 for nicotine products, even though patient exposure to nicotine replacement products was much greater and measured over a longer period of time. [10]
Suicidal behaviors were also prominently featured in regulatory agency reports of adverse events in Canada [23] and Australia,[18] and in the New Zealand patient monitoring study.[5]

Aggression/Violence
Thoughts and acts of aggression/violence associated with drugs are quite familiar (such as domestic violence associated with alcohol intoxication), but the association with correctly administered therapeutic drugs (involuntary intoxication) has not been well studied in systematic scientific research.
CHANTIX, however, has proved a valuable research topic because adverse event reports were so numerous, and they occurred in a diverse smoking cessation population (most often women of middle years) where fewer alternative causes of violence were likely confounding variables.
The FDA’s OSE studied five report terms describing aggression and violence using a Bayesian statistical technique applied to a small early subset of CHANTIX adverse event data.[4] The primary measure–Empirical Bayes Geometric Mean (EBGM)–returned a relative risk equivalent compared to all other drugs that ranged from 17.1 for homicidal ideation to 5.4 for hostility. In comparison, bupropion had an EBGM of 4.4 for homicidal ideation and no reported cases of hostility.

A peer-reviewed study of violent thoughts and acts reported for all evaluable drugs used a different statistical technique to measure disproportionality—the Proportional Reporting Ratio (PRR)—and a much larger universe of all case reports from all drugs from 2004 through the third quarter of 2009.[6]

This Aggression/Violence PRR study identified 31 drugs associated with thoughts and acts of violence and ranked them by PRR (a relative risk concept). The study compared the proportion of aggression/violence events for each drug, to the proportion for all other drugs, thereby adjusting for differences in the total number of reports. CHANTIX accounted for more thoughts/acts of violence than any other therapeutic drug by all measures in the study.

Table 2 shows that CHANTIX accounted for 18 times as many reports of violent thoughts and acts as would be expected given the total number of reports for that drug (PRR = 18), and compares it to two other smoking cessation treatments. CHANTIX accounted for 408 cases in total, more than any other therapeutic drug, even though it was only marketed for 14 of the 23 calendar quarters in the study. Bupropion also indicated increased risk but to a lesser degree.

A French pharmacovigilance research team performed a related case/non-case study in the French PharmacoVigilance Database.[9] Although the French data universe was substantially smaller, the Reporting Odds Ratio (ROR) for CHANTIX was 29.2 (95% CI 10.8-78.9). Note that the CHANTIX PRR of 18 in the U.S. study overlaps the broad confidence intervals in the French study.

An additional study in QuarterWatch examined all reports of homicidal thoughts for all drugs, but focused on all the adverse event data from 2007 through the third quarter of 2013, essentially capturing the entire period CHANTIX was marketed. An unadjusted ranking is shown in Table 3.[16]

These data show that CHANTIX accounted for more reports of homicidal ideation than any other therapeutic drug over a 75-month period. The number of cases was 5-times larger than second-ranked quetiapine, and 12-times larger than pregabalin. In 2013 Q3 all the other drugs on the list of 10 most frequently reported drugs had greater patient exposure than CHANTIX, except for interferon beta, where exposure was unknown and the patient population is smaller.

Psychosis
Psychosis may involve auditory or visual hallucinations, paranoia, delusions, or disorganized speech. These may involve acts of violence related to the delusions or paranoia. These are not typical symptoms of smoking cessation.
Psychotic behaviors have been identified in CHANTIX patients in clinical studies [24], the Pfizer-Tonstad meta-analysis [25], an FDA OSE report[4], and in QuarterWatch assessments [11].
The 2008 FDA OSE report identified 98 cases of psychosis for CHANTIX with 3.5 times as many cases as bupropion, adjusted for prescription volume. The OSE disproportionality analysis compared CHANTIX to all other drugs and showed an unexpectedly large number of reports for eight different symptoms ranging from an EBGM of 7.7 for paranoia to 3.5 for hallucinations. In these OSE data, psychosis reports (n = 98) were more numerous than and disproportional to those categorized as aggression (n = 48). The report also quoted Pfizer as stating two cases were seen in preapproval clinical studies. In the Pfizer-Tonstad meta-analysis of selected clinical trial data, “Disturbances in thinking and perception” were reported more frequently with CHANTIX than placebo (13 vs 2 cases, RR = 3.29, p = not significant).

The New Zealand Prescription Event Monitoring Program [5] provided additional insights because despite a relatively small population of 3,415 patients, it had access to medical and other records, which provides an improved follow-up compared to adverse event reports. It also conducted case causality assessments. This report identified three cases of hospitalization for psychosis; all occurred within 2 weeks of starting CHANTIX and all resolved on discontinuation of CHANTIX.

A small Pfizer-supported clinical trial [26] in patients with previous mental illness compared 208 patients on CHANTIX with 204 taking nicotine replacement therapy. It reported one CHANTIX case as “a severe psychological reaction likened to a ‘bad LSD trip’, including anxiety, paranoia, confusion and impaired motor control.” It was not reported whether symptoms resolved on discontinuation and no case was reported in the comparison group.

In the initial 2008 QuarterWatch report on CHANTIX adverse events, reports of psychosis/psychotic disorders (n = 397) outnumbered those of suicide/self-injury (n = 227).[11]

In the most recent FDA adverse event data for the 12 months ending 2013 Q3, report totals for the two kinds of injury were similar: Psychosis (n = 102) and suicide/self-injury (n =123). In both comparisons, however, a case could include symptoms in both categories.[16]

Depression
Depression raises measurement and identification issues because it varies in severity and waxes and wanes, rather than being a single dramatic episode such as completed suicide or psychotic break, and has much higher prevalence. In addition, although it was prominent in the 2009 Boxed Warning, a specific FDA OSE report supporting the regulatory action was not identified. However, strong evidence that CHANTIX causes or exacerbates depression can be seen in numerous other reports.

In the Suicide/Depression Smoking Cessation Study [10], the depression odds ratio for CHANTIX compared to nicotine replacement products was similar to the suicidal behaviors: OR = 8.5 (95% CI 6.5-11.0). As with suicidal behavior, the volume of cases adds scientific weight. CHANTIX accounted for 2,000 reported cases of depression assessed as serious, compared to 58 for nicotine replacement products.

In the initial 2008 QuarterWatch report on CHANTIX, reports of depression (n = 287) were second only to nausea, the most frequent side effect in clinical studies. In the Pfizer-Tonstad meta-analysis, depression was the second most frequently reported psychiatric side effect.

Reports of depression have continued for many years. In the FDA adverse event data 12 months ending 2013 Q3, “Depression” was the single most frequent adverse event term for the drug (n = 93).

Distinctive Features of CHANTIX Reactions
While the four psychiatric event categories in this petition—suicidal ideation and behavior, aggression/violence, psychosis, and depression—capture the spectrum of CHANTIX adverse effects, they do not fully portray the unique character that distinguishes many CHANTIX events. Examining individual cases and case series provides insight into CHANTIX events and show how to identify and prevent them.

Case # 1: Assault
By the third day of taking Chantix I was completely out of control. I woke my boyfriend up in the middle of the night and started physically beating him. I contemplated suicide about 5 times a day and contemplated homicide about 3 times a day.
This case shows early onset prior to smoking cessation, sleep disturbance, homicidal ideation, suicidal ideation, and later but not shown here, attempted suicide. Female, age 24, (ISR 5742066 )

Case #2: Terrifying Nightmares
She had a nightmare on 23Dec2007 that she was lying in prison laying on a cold wet floor shackled to a corpse. On 26Dec2007 she wanted to get the key to the gun cabinet and shoot her husband.” She stopped taking Chantix and “everything setting her off resolved on 28Dec2007.”
This case shows a sleep disturbance so vivid it approaches a hallucination, and is followed by an apparently unrelated episode of homicidal ideation and dechallenge. Female, age 43 (ISR 5587336)

Case # 3: Anger/Aggression
She swung at her mother (who was in her late 90’s) due to the extreme rage as she almost struck her and missed. She went out in the back yard and broke a weed wacker, a couple of glasses, the frame work on a couple of lamps, she threw concrete in the backyard and she began stabbing chunks of wood with the garden tools to get her rage out.
In this case report reviewed by FDA OSE the index event was suicidal ideation, but the narrative excerpt portrays uncontrolled aggression/anger and senseless violence.[4]

Case #4: Screaming and Crying
On Saturday while at home she got into a verbal argument with her mom over a minor issue and reports now that she was ‘totally out of hand’ and she was unable to control her impulses and was yelling and screaming and crying. She acutely became suicidal and also became homicidal threatening her mother with a shotgun. Her mother fled the house and called police. She locked herself in the bathroom and eventually calmed down.
Suicidal behavior and senseless aggressive acts occur together. Female, age 21 (ISR 5821157)

Case #5: Suicide Attempt
After 2 weeks of taking Chantix, I flew into a fit of uncontrollable rage after consuming alcohol one evening – resulting in me beating my boyfriend, followed by an attempt to take my own life. An overnight stay in the ER followed.
Senseless aggression and suicide attempt. Symptoms resolved on discontinuation. Female, age 28 (ISR 5626093)

Case #6: Homicide
Appellant was nineteen years old and had been in the service for approximately a year. Prior to enlisting, Appellant was an active member of his community and led various volunteering and mentoring projects as an Eagle Scout. Upon turning eighteen, both Appellant and his twin brother enlisted in the United States Army. After successfully completing Infantry Training and the Airborne Course, they were both selected for an appointment to the United States Military Academy Preparatory School (USMAPS), class of 2009. [Was temporarily assigned to a supply room at Fort Benning and prescribed Chantix ].

Appellant had been experiencing “new and strange thoughts” including a “person [was] telling me . . . dangerous things that arent [sic] me.” These included violent thoughts of killing someone. On May 18, 2008, one month after the Army doctor prescribed Chantix, Appellant fatally attacked Private (PVT) Bulmer while he was sleeping, stabbing him to death. Prior to this attack, Appellant did not know nor had he ever interacted with PVT Bulmer.

This case includes nightmares, psychosis, homicidal ideation, senseless act, and homicide. Male, age 19. Extracted from appeals court judgment reversing his murder conviction because the judge did not allow a CHANTIX defense of involuntary intoxication.[28]

Published Case Series
Based on a peer reviewed case series analysis of 26 cases involving thoughts and acts of aggression/violence in association with CHANTIX [7], the distinctive characteristics of these events are described in Table 2, reproduced below from the published study. This is one of the first studies that examined the characteristics of cases of violence associated with involuntary drug intoxication.

Findings Are Robust
The scientific evidence that CHANTIX causes four types of psychiatric adverse effects is robust. The numbers of reported cases are so large it would be illogical to conclude that thousands of trained medical professionals who observed these cases were always wrong. It would be illogical to discount the reports of thousands of consumers who told of frightening or destructive experiences with CHANTIX that had never occurred before. This disproportional reporting of CHANTIX psychiatric adverse effects was established using three different statistical methods: Proportional Reporting Ratio, Reporting Odds Ratio, and a Bayesian method, the Empirical Bayes Geometric Mean (EBGM). Consistent results were seen by different research teams in the United States, France, and New Zealand. Many cases were confirmed using case-causality tools. They showed events occurring in patients with no previous history of psychiatric illness in which symptoms began soon after starting treatment, often prior to quitting smoking. In most—but not all—episodes, symptoms resolved on discontinuation. In addition, cases from multiple sources documented that symptoms resumed if treatment started again.

Limitations
Although reports are numerous, worldwide, and extend over many years, they do not provide a reliable estimate of the incidence of serious psychiatric adverse events in CHANTIX patients. The observational studies and meta-analysis studies below suggest that such cases, although catastrophic and distinctive, are comparatively rare. This is a characteristic shared by many well-documented serious adverse effects such as Stevens-Johnson syndrome, rhabdomyolysis, osteonecrosis of the jaw, and progressive multifocal leukoencephalopathy (PML). All these adverse effects are rare and are seldom identified in clinical trials. Further, while many of the adverse event cases described above included specific causality assessments, the statistical studies were based on all submitted reports. However, these limitations would apply to all of the comparison drugs; there is no evidence that the CHANTIX reports were uniquely defective.

Part 1: Conclusion
Studies from multiple sources using varying scientific approaches demonstrate that CHANTIX causes serious psychiatric adverse effects. The first paragraph of the Boxed Warning Highlights should state:
Serious neuropsychiatric events have been reported in patients taking CHANTIX, including suicidal behavior, aggression/violence, psychosis, and depression.
These same four adverse effects should also be delineated more clearly in the longer Boxed Warning in the main section of the product label.

Part 2: Impairment in Sensitive Occupations
It is self-evident that a drug capable of inducing episodes of anger, rage, psychosis, and hostility should be banned in sensitive occupations such as pilot, air traffic controller, military crews, police, and many other military personnel. The CHANTIX accident risk also extends to a series of neurological (or possibly cardiac) effects that include blackout/syncope, convulsions, and impaired vision. Less severe forms of impairment include dizziness and somnolence.

Evidence
Concerns about the use of CHANTIX in sensitive or hazardous occupations were published as early as May 2008.[11] Of particular concern were reports of accidents and injuries (n = 173) and in particular 28 road traffic accidents. Another 148 case reports indicated vision disturbances with the potential to cause accidents.
The FDA OSE followed up on those published findings with its own assessment in October 2008, “Varenicline and automobile accidents.”[29] By this later date, the FDA knew about 441 cases of accidents and injuries, including 68 road traffic accidents. The FDA analyzed 39 cases and listed contributing factors, in order of frequency, as anxiety-related, abnormal behavior, memory impairment, visual disturbance, dizziness-related, and loss of consciousness.

That 2008 FDA report was the first and possibly only assessment to examine event onset, and the results raised an additional safety concern. Unlike many psychiatric adverse effects where onset appeared to be quite early, that was not necessarily the case for these adverse effects. It showed that in 7/35 (20%) of cases the impairment/accident occurred between 60 and 140 days after initiating treatment. Given a recommended initial treatment period of 12 weeks (84 days) this means that his adverse effect could appear at any time during treatment despite no serious initial reactions.

The accident/ impairment risks are also supported by the clinical trials data.[1] In the current product label description of clinical trials experience, these are frequent neurological adverse effects: disturbance in attention, dizziness, sensory disturbance. Infrequent events included amnesia, syncope, tremor, and psychomotor hyperactivity.

Actions Taken
Currently, the Federal Aviation Administration has banned the use of CHANTIX by pilots and air traffic controllers.[30] The Department of Defense has banned it for pilots, missile crews, and possibly other military personnel.[31] The Department of Veterans Affairs has restricted CHANTIX only to patients who have failed alternative smoking cessation treatments, and requires psychiatric screening before use and weekly monitoring.[32] We do not know whether state or local entities have restricted CHANTIX in other sensitive occupations such as police, fire fighters, ambulance drivers, nuclear power plant operators, and construction crane operators.
The FDA required a specific label warning for accident risk, noting reports but stating “Advise patients to use caution driving or operating machinery or engaging in other potentially hazardous occupations until they know how CHANTIX may affect them.”

Part 2: Conclusion and Actions Requested
The Indications section of the label should contain a clear and unambiguous restriction on the use of CHANTIX in hazardous or sensitive occupations. The list should include as examples specific occupations such as airline pilot, military missile crew, nuclear power plant operator, and police officers who carry weapons in the field.
Deficiencies in the current warning increase safety risks because the vague phrase “until they know how CHANTIX may affect them” implies that in the absence of early symptoms there is no further risk. On the contrary, neurological or cardiac impairment can occur at any time during treatment. This vague statement increases risk of accidental injury and should be removed without delay.

Part 3: Inappropriate Promotional Material in Boxed Warning
The Highlights section Boxed Warning may be unique in FDA regulation because in addition to the warning, it contains promotional material about the benefits of smoking cessation. Here is the passage, which FDA documents show was inserted at the request of Pfizer.
Weigh the risks of CHANTIX against benefits of its use. CHANTIX has been demonstrated to increase the likelihood of abstinence from smoking for as long as one year compared to treatment with placebo. The health benefits of quitting smoking are immediate and substantial.
The benefits of quitting smoking are well known. The petitioners request that this promotional language be removed for two reasons: a) The force and clarity of the FDA’s most important warning format should not be diluted with extraneous benefits information; b) The specific promotional language is misleading and not an accurate summary of CHANTIX benefits.
Diluting Warnings
Because it was not feasible to screen more than 60,000 product labels on the FDA/National Library of Medicine web site, the petitioners inspected Boxed Warnings for a diverse sample of drugs in 10 different therapeutic classes. The following table shows the drugs and type of adverse effects identified for this most prominent FDA warning type.
Table 3 shows that the types of risks described are all appropriate for a Boxed Warning and of roughly the same severity or clinical importance as the psychiatric adverse effects of CHANTIX. However, not one of the 10 Boxed Warnings contained even a sentence or phrase about treatment benefits. In fact it would be quite odd for an anti-neoplastic drug to contain language about the importance of treating cancer in the warning section.

Specific Misleading Content
The sentence “The health benefits of quitting smoking are immediate and substantial” is misleading because none of the clinical trials of CHANTIX have demonstrated an “immediate” or “substantial” health benefit. In smoking cessation literature, that passage normally refers to the fact that while pulmonary toxicity of tobacco products takes years to resolve, reduced cardiovascular risk is the most important immediate benefit of quitting. In the case of CHANTIX the opposite is true. Meta-analysis has shown 30% increased cardiovascular risks [33] over 52 weeks of treatment rather than the lower risks predicted by other smoking cessation studies. Thus, for CHANTIX this statement is at best unproven, and probably false.
The sentence “CHANTIX has been demonstrated to increase the likelihood of abstinence from smoking for as long as one year compared to treatment with placebo” is vague and could be misunderstood. The placebo group was an unusual and unique comparison group. Enrolled patients were informed they might be given medication that investigators believed could reduce their tobacco craving, but instead, by getting a placebo, many subjects underwent abrupt nicotine withdrawal symptoms. Typically in clinical trials, most placebo controls are not subject to harmful effects. The Boxed Warning statement also might lead to an overestimation of the likely results of CHANTIX smoking cessation treatment. Clinical trials with 52-week follow up showed confirmed abstinence rates that ranged from approximately 21% for CHANTIX compared to 14% for bupropion and 10% for “placebo.[1]” In addition, the current label omits the most relevant efficacy study, which compared CHANTIX to the nicotine patch. In that study, at 52 weeks there was no statistically significant difference between CHANTIX and nicotine replacement in 7 day point prevalence of abstinence (34.8% vs 31.4%, p = 0.285) and a small difference in continuous abstinence rate (25.9% vs 19.8%, p = 0.04). Moreover, the analysis of efficacy belongs in Section 14, the Clinical Studies section of the label.

Part 3: Conclusion
The entire paragraph of misleading promotional information should be removed from the CHANTIX label Boxed Warning. The agency’s most important warning statements should be brief and focused to maximize their impact to promote drug safety, not diluted with other material.

Part 4: Meta-Analysis and Observational Studies
Sound drug risk analysis should be based on the full scope of scientific information available, including mechanism of action, case reports in clinical studies, spontaneous adverse event reports, meta-analysis of clinical studies, and observational studies.
On September 17, 2014, the FDA approved a new version of the CHANTIX label that described two new meta-analyses (unpublished) and four observational studies.[1] The studies are shown in Table 4. The first two observational studies shown in the Table 4 as “FDA DoD Hospitalization” and “FDA VA Hospitalization” are very similar, were led by the same FDA OSE team using the same endpoint in two different databases, and were reported together in the same Drug Safety Communication. [20]

Key Scientific Questions
The scientific question is whether studies with no statistically significant difference with a comparison group provide an assurance of safety (since no increased risk was seen) or whether the methodologies were simply incapable of detecting a difference if one existed. Did these studies have an appropriate sample, validated outcome measures, and adequate control groups to demonstrate whether or not CHANTIX increases the risk of psychiatric adverse effects? Finally a pivotal regulatory question is whether these studies are so well done and compelling that they should persuade the scientific community to disregard or discount all the other evidence gathered through other methods.

All six studies detected no statistically significant differences in selected psychiatric adverse effects between CHANTIX and various comparators. All six studies share the methodological flaw that they could only assess a small fraction of the four serious CHANTIX psychiatric side effects, suicidal behavior, aggression/violence, psychosis, and depression. This is a critical drawback in assessing serious psychiatric adverse effects known to be rare.

The Suicidal Ideation/Behavior meta-analysis included only five studies and did not assess hostility/aggression, depression or psychosis. In addition, the meta analysis excluded a majority of 14 or more trials that monitored psychiatric adverse effects.[25] Moreover, one of the five studies was of smokers with a history of schizophrenia; no explanation was given for including that study in a meta analysis with 4 studies of non-schizophrenic smokers. The meta-analysis has not been published in the peer reviewed literature and no justification for the inclusion or exclusion criteria is provided on the label. With so much data excluded without explanation, the results of this meta analysis are questionable and should be excluded from the label.

The Psychiatric Adverse Events meta-analysis excluded both the most common psychiatric side effects (nightmares/ sleep disturbances), and all of the rarest side effects (a 1% threshold). There is no justification for these exclusions, which bias the results.

Two FDA OSE observational studies were limited to psychiatric hospitalizations, even though 85% of the four serious psychiatric side effects seen in adverse event data did not result in hospitalization.[22]

The British Medical Records Study examined only suicidal behaviors and depression, and had limited capability to detect depression because nearly 47% of the study population had present or previous use of antidepressant medication, and was excluded from this calculation.[34]

The Danish Medical Records study [35] only captured hospitalization and emergency room visits for the first 30 days after CHANTIX use was initiated.

None of the six studies reported investigating whether the psychiatric adverse effects remitted on discontinuation of treatment.
None of the six studies reported a statistically significant difference between CHANTIX and comparators for any adverse endpoints. However, it is impossible to determine whether this lack of a statistically significant difference was because of a weak design that did not capture all psychiatric side effects or whether it indicates safety. The two FDA OSE studies were based on diagnostic codes in electronic health records that had not been validated. The Danish Medical Record study only compared CHANTIX to bupropion, which also has labeled psychiatric side effects, and only assessed the first 30 days of treatment. None of the studies reported assessing violence/aggression, a problematic endpoint in medical records based studies but one of the most commonly reported.

Incidence Evaluated
Clinical trials and observational studies provide limited basic information about incidence, which is problematic in adverse drug event reporting. In the CHANTIX New Drug Application (n = 3,490 on active drug), clinical studies were conducted in a selected patient population that excluded persons with a mental disorder (including current depression) and those taking nearly any psychoactive or stimulant drug, including the cold medication pseudoephedrine.[24] The sponsor reported 1 CHANTIX suicide and 2 CHANTIX psychosis cases, versus none in comparators. However, this was a very limited study population that is not generalizable to most smokers. CDC estimates that approximately 25% of the public reports having a mental illness in the past year, and that smoking rates are 76% higher among those with current mental illness (36% vs 21%).[36,37]

The Danish Medical Records study reported an incidence of the emergency room/hospitalization events of approximately 2 per 1,000 prescription starts. However, this study could not capture the many psychiatric side effects that would not result in emergency medical treatment or hospitalization.
The New Zealand patient monitoring study used case causality assessment and reported new onset depression in 26 of 3415 patients or approximately 7 per 1000 starts and psychosis in 3 cases.[5]
It is difficult to evaluate acute psychiatric adverse reactions in large studies because of limitations in the availability of those data; most patients are not hospitalized and many such episodes are not included in medical records. The data from these studies therefore provide limited assurance that serious adverse reactions are probably rare, but unfortunately the studies are not adequate to determine the incidence of these adverse reactions because of the aforementioned substantial methodological shortcomings of each of these studies.

Part 4: Conclusion
The meta-analysis and observational study results establish that the four serious psychiatric side effects of CHANTIX may be uncommon. However, none of the studies are of sufficient quality to establish a convincing estimate of incidence, provide a valid comparison to other treatments, or have the scientific weight to refute evidence from other scientific methods.

Part 5: References

1. Prescribing information for CHANTIX (varenicline tartrate) tablet, film coated [package insert]. (2014) New York, NY: Pfizer Inc.
2. Pollock M. (2008) Varenicline and automobile accidents. Silver Spring, MD: FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research.
3. Pollock M, Mosholder A. (2008) Suicidality: varenicline; bupropion; nicotine transdermal patch. Silver Spring, MD: Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research.
4. Pollock M, Mosholder A. (2008) Psychiatric events (excluding suicides) : Varenicline and bupropion. Silver Spring, MD: FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research.
5. Harrison-Woolrych M, Ashton J. (2011) Psychiatric adverse events associated with varenicline: an intensive postmarketing prospective cohort study in New Zealand. Drug Saf 34: 763–772.
6. Moore TJ, Glenmullen J, Furberg CD. (2010) Prescription drugs associated with reports of violence towards others. PLoS ONE 5: e15337.
7. Moore TJ, Glenmullen J, Furberg CD. (2010) Thoughts and acts of aggression/violence toward others reported in association with varenicline. Ann Pharmacother 44: 1389–1394.
8. Moore TJ, Furberg CD. (2009) Risk of psychiatric side effects with varenicline. BMJ 339: b4964–b4964.
9. Rouve N, Bagheri H, Telmon N, Pathak A, Franchitto N, et al. (2011) Prescribed drugs and violence: a case/noncase study in the French PharmacoVigilance Database. Eur J Clin Pharmacol 67: 1189–1198.
10. Moore TJ, Furberg CD, Glenmullen J, Maltsberger JT, Singh S. (2011) Suicidal behavior and depression in smoking cessation treatments. PLoS ONE 6: e27016.
11. Moore TJ, Cohen MF, Furberg CD. (2008) Strong Signal Seen on New Varenicline Risks. Institute for Safe Medication Practices. URL: http://www.ismp.org/QuarterWatch/chantixReport.asp. Accessed 22 September 2009.
12. Moore TJ, Cohen MF, Furberg CD. (2008) QuarterWatch: 2008 Quarter 1 : Chantix Injury Reports Exceed All Other Drugs for a Second Quarter. Insitute for Safe Medication Practices. URL: http://www.ismp.org/QuarterWatch/2008Q1.pdf.
13. Moore TJ, Cohen MF, Furberg CD. (2009) QuarterWatch: 2008 Quarter 2 : Surge in Reports of Psychiatric Side Effects for Singulair. Institute for Safe Medication Practices. URL: http://www.ismp.org/QuarterWatch/2008Q2.pdf.
14. Moore TJ, Cohen MR, Furberg CD. (2011) QuarterWatch: 2010 Quarter 2: Signals for Varenicline, Levofloxacin and Fentanyl. Institute for Safe Medication Practices. URL: http://www.ismp.org/QuarterWatch/2010Q2.pdf.
15. Moore TJ, Cohen MR, Furberg CD. (2011) QuarterWatch: 2010 Quarter 3: New Signals for Liraglutide, Quetiapine and Varenicline. Institute for Safe Medication Practices. URL: http://www.ismp.org/QuarterWatch/2010Q3.pdf.
16. Moore TJ, Cohen MR, Mattison DR, Furberg CD. (2013) QuarterWatch 2013 Quarter 3: Signals for Dimethyl fumarate (TECFIDERA), varenicline (CHANTIX), sodium oxybate (XYREM) and fingolimod (GILENYA). Institute for Safe Medication Practices. URL: http://www.ismp.org/QuarterWatch/pdfs/2013Q3.pdf.
17. Longo M, McMorran M. (2008) Varenicline (Champix) and serious psychiatric reactions. Canadian Adverse Reaction Newsletter 18: 1–2.
18. Elijah J. (2010) Medicines Safety Update: Varenicline (Champix): An Update. Australian Prescriber 33: 120–121.
19. PFIZER INC. Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 for the fiscal year ended December31, 2012. (2013) Washington, DC: United States Securities and Exchange Commission.
20. FDA Drug Safety Communication: Safety review update of Chantix (varenicline) and risk of neuropsychiatric adverse events. (2011) US Food and Drug Administration web site. URL: http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/ucm276737.htm. Accessed 21 August 2014.
21. Meyer TE, Taylor LG, Xie S, Graham DJ, Mosholder AD, et al. (2013) Neuropsychiatric events in varenicline and nicotine replacement patch users in the Military Health System. Addiction 108: 203–210.
22. Kuehn BM. (2012) New reports examine psychiatric risks of varenicline for smoking cessation. JAMA 307: 129–130.
23. Canadian Adverse Reaction Newsletter, Volume 21 – Issue 2 – April 2011. (2011). URL: http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/medeff/bulletin/carn-bcei_v21n2-eng.php#a3. Accessed 19 April 2011.
24. Josefberg H. (2006) Clinical Safety Review NDA 21-928 Varenicline tartrate. Silver Spring, MD: Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research.
25. Tonstad S, Davies S, Flammer M, Russ C, Hughes J. (2010) Psychiatric adverse events in randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled clinical trials of varenicline: a pooled analysis. Drug Saf 33: 289–301.
26. Stapleton JA, Watson L, Spirling LI, Smith R, Milbrandt A, et al. (2008) Varenicline in the routine treatment of tobacco dependence: a pre-post comparison with nicotine replacement therapy and an evaluation in those with mental illness. Addiction 103: 146–154.
27. Bancila V, Dallon C, Zullino D. (2009) Varenicline may induce psychotic symptoms in subjects without previous history of psychiatric disorders. Acta Neuropsychiatria 21: 267–268.
28. UNITED STATES, Appellee v. George B MACDONALD, Private First Class, U.S. Army, Appellant. No. 14-0001 Crim App. No. 20091118. (2014) Washington: United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.
29. Pollock M. (2008) Varenicline and automobile accidents. Silver Spring, MD: Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research.
30. Pharmaceuticals (Therapeutic Medications) Do Not Issue – Do Not Fly. (2014) Guide for Aviation Medical Examiners. URL: https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/avs/offices/aam/ame/guide/pharm/dni_dnf/. Accessed 15 September 2014.
31. Rake G. (2008) DoD Medication Safety Notice. Department of Defense Patient Safety Program. URL: http://www.healthquality.va.gov/guidelines/CD/mtu/varenicline_safety_notice.pdf. Accessed 27 September 2014.
32. Varenicline Criteria for Prescribing. (2011) Pittsburg, PA: VA Center for Medication Safety.
33. Singh S, Loke YK, Spangler JG, Furberg CD. (2011) Risk of serious adverse cardiovascular events associated with varenicline: a systematic review and meta-analysis. CMAJ 183: 1359–1366.
34. Thomas KH, Martin RM, Davies NM, Metcalfe C, Windmeijer F, et al. (2013) Smoking cessation treatment and risk of depression, suicide, and self harm in the Clinical Practice Research Datalink: prospective cohort study. BMJ 347: f5704.
35. Pasternak B, Svanström H, Hviid A. (2013) Use of varenicline versus bupropion and risk of psychiatric adverse events. Addiction 108: 1336–1343.
36. Reeves W, Strine TW. (2011) Mental Illness Surveillance Among Adults in the United States. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR). URL: http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/su6003a1.htm?s_cid=su6003a1_w. Accessed 1 October 2014.
37. CDC VitalSigns – Adult Smoking: Focusing on People with Mental Illness. (2013) CDC VitalSigns. URL: http://www.cdc.gov/VitalSigns/smokingandmentalillness/. Accessed 1 October 2014.

C. Certification and signature pages follow in official filed document

Testimony of Dr. Laurén Doamekpor, senior fellow, on Sonoblate treatment for prostate cancer

October 1, 2014

Good morning. Thank you for the opportunity to speak today. My name is Dr. Laurén Doamekpor, and I am a senior fellow at the Cancer Prevention and Treatment Fund. Our research center scrutinizes scientific and medical data and provides objective health information to patients, providers and policy makers. We do not accept funding from device companies and therefore I have no conflicts of interest.

We all know that current treatments for prostate cancer have side effects that harm men’s quality of life. While most men diagnosed with localized, low-risk prostate cancer will likely die from something else, not from prostate cancer, recurrent prostate cancer frightens patients and needs to be treated. However, any new treatment should show clear evidence that the benefits outweigh the risks. We are not convinced that the HIFU device achieves this goal.

The analysis of the primary endpoint showed that 64% of the patients who were treated with this device had obtained local control of prostate cancer at 1 year after treatment. But that doesn’t tell us anything about long-term effectiveness, which is key for prostate cancer.  Proof of long-term effectiveness would also require a control group or comparison group, which this application lacks.

The sponsor’s goal was a 40% success rate at 1 year, and they achieved that. However, even a 64% success rate at one year is very low compared to the long-term success rate of prostate surgery.  We share the FDA’s skepticism that this device should be approved based on this low 1-year success rate.

In addition, the safety profile is not impressive. Incontinence was reported in 43% of patients, and was still 31% after one year. That is worse than most studies of prostate surgery, which has a much higher long-term success rate.

With only 100 patients in the study and no long-term data, the sponsor has not provided enough data to justify approval.  The small sample includes only 13 Black patients, even though prostate cancer is more deadly for Blacks. There are only 5 Hispanic patients.  The sponsor says they did subgroup analysis of effectiveness and that Blacks did well with the treatment.  The Advisory Committee should demand to see the safety and effectiveness outcomes separately for Blacks and Whites.

The sponsor is already enrolling a 2nd cohort of 100 patients, and FDA should delay an approval decision until those data are submitted.  The FDA should also require at least 2-3 years of data before the agency decides whether to approve this device. While we commend the sponsor for its plan to conduct a 5-year post treatment study, it would be unfair to patients to pay for an unproven device based on such a small, short-term study.

In summary, the study is too small, too short term, and has no comparison sample.  It has too few Blacks and Hispanics. Evidence of long-term effectiveness is needed BEFORE approval, not as a post-approval study.

That’s why we urge you to vote NO 3 times: the data from the study do NOT support a reasonable assurance of safety OR  effectiveness for this device and that therefore we can NOT conclude that the benefits outweigh the risks.

At the end of the meeting, the panel voted 10 to 0 with 1 abstention that benefits of the device do NOT outweigh the risks.

Testimony for FDA meeting on sunscreen active ingredient safety testing

Delivered by Dr. Anna Mazzucco
September 4, 2014

 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today on behalf of the Cancer Prevention and Treatment Fund. My name is Dr. Anna Mazzucco, and after completing my Ph.D. in Cell and Developmental Biology from Harvard Medical School I conducted research at the National Cancer Institute. I bring those perspectives today.

Our nonprofit research center conducts research and scrutinizes data to provide objective and reliable information to patients and providers.  Our president is on the Board of Directors of the Alliance for a Stronger FDA, which is a nonprofit dedicated to increasing the resources that the FDA needs to do its job.  Our organization does not accept funding from pharmaceutical companies, and therefore I have no conflict of interest.

In 2014 almost 10,000 Americans died from melanoma skin cancer, and 76,000 new cases were diagnosed.1  Despite warnings to avoid sun exposure, adults and children are spending a great deal of time in the sun, thus making safe and effective sunscreens essential to prevent skin cancer.  At the same time, Americans are using sunscreens more frequently and on a more long-term basis than ever before, as the FDA’s report noted.

Therefore, our safety and efficacy standards must reflect that Americans of all ages rely on these products regularly.  In its prepared questions, FDA scientists point out the lack of safety testing in pediatric populations.  I hope you’ll agree that we need conclusive evidence that these products are safe for children, and also for prenatal exposures when pregnant women use them.  Clinical studies must include separate analyses of these and other vulnerable populations before products can be marketed for widespread use.

Studies of several active ingredients currently on the market have raised concerns about photostability—how long the protections last under real-world conditions.2

Testing for photostability should be required as part of the pre-market testing of sunscreen active ingredients.  Consumers need to know how long products so that they can avoid increased skin cancer risk.

Several active ingredients currently on the market have also shown potential endocrine-disrupting or carcinogenic activity.3 4   We support the FDA scientists’ proposal to require that active ingredients be tested for carcinogenic and developmental and reproductive toxicity prior to marketing.  Research shows that endocrine-disrupting agents often have greater risks at low doses,5 so dose-response testing is not appropriate for these studies.  Without well-designed studies, children and others who are particularly susceptible could be harmed by these hormone-altering ingredients.

There is also research evidence that certain active ingredients demonstrate potentially carcinogenic activity when exposed to UV light, such as generating free radicals that damage DNA and can cause harmful mutations.  Testing for carcinogenic activity should be done under conditions that reflect real-world use as closely as possible, i.e. during UV light exposure.  Such carefully designed testing is needed to ensure that safety data is reliable and meaningful.  Without such information, products intended to help prevent cancer may do just the opposite.

As you consider FDA’s questions, please pay special attention to the issue of combining active ingredients with different vehicles, to make sure that does NOT result in final product formulations which are marketed over-the-counter without any additional testing.  We agree with FDA scientists that different vehicles could change the properties or absorption of active ingredients in ways that could affect safety or efficacy of the final product.  As medical professionals, please urge the FDA to directly confront this problem through additional testing requirements that can ensure products that will be safe and effective for all consumers.

Sign on letter to Senator Nelson on child nicotine poisoning

August 11, 2014

The Honorable Bill Nelson
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Nelson:

On behalf of organizations dedicated to improving the health and safety of children, we write to express our support for the Child Nicotine Poisoning Prevention Act of 2014. This legislation recognizes the danger that liquid nicotine used to refill electronic cigarettes poses to small children and gives the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) the authority to require the use of child-proof packaging on liquid nicotine containers sold to consumers.

Recent data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) indicate that there were 215 calls to poison control centers related to e-cigarettes in February 2014 alone, up from only one call per month in 2010. Liquid nicotine is highly toxic and sold in a highly concentrated form. It is common to find liquid nicotine containing upwards of 36 mg of nicotine per milliliter of liquid. At this concentration, a small 15 mL dropper bottle of liquid nicotine would contain over 500 mg of nicotine. Given that the estimated lethal dose of nicotine is 1 to 13 mg per kilogram of body weight, even at the high end of this range a bottle of liquid nicotine at this size and concentration would be enough to kill four toddlers.

In addition, these products come in bright colors and candy flavors that make these substances likely candidates for ingestion by young children. Alarmingly, these products are often sold in containers without any child-proofing, and there are currently no federal requirements for child-proof packaging for liquid nicotine despite the highly toxic nature of these products. Given that liquid nicotine may also be absorbed quickly through the skin as well as ingested, children are in extreme danger of being poisoned without simple safeguards to ensure that these liquids stay sealed in their containers.

CPSC has the expertise to quickly require child-proof packaging for liquid nicotine if given the authority by Congress. The Commission currently requires such packaging on toxic household substances like bleach, as well as Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-regulated products like prescription drugs. Parents have come to expect that household products that can cause serious harm to children come in child-resistant packaging. Liquid nicotine should be no different.

The FDA is in the process of extending its regulatory authority to include additional types of tobacco products, including e-cigarettes and liquid nicotine. S. 2581 preserves FDA’s authority to regulate the manufacture, marketing, sale, and distribution of tobacco products and the packages and containers in which they are sold. We also encourage action by the FDA to protect children from child poisoning and other dangers posed by tobacco products and their containers.

This is an urgent public health danger and quick action is needed to ensure that child poisoning from liquid nicotine is addressed as soon as possible. We look forward to working with you to pass this important legislation.

Sincerely,
American Academy of Otolaryngology – Head and Neck Surgery
American Academy of Pediatrics
American Association of Poison Control Centers
American Association for Respiratory Care
American College of Cardiology
American College of Physicians
American College of Preventive Medicine
American Public Health Association
Arizona Consumers Council
Association of Maternal and Child Health Programs
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials
Boston Public Health Commission
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids
Cancer Prevention and Treatment Fund
Chicago Consumer Coalition
Consumer Federation of America
Consumer Federation of California
Consumer Federation of the Southeast
Consumers Union
EverThrive Illinois
First Focus Campaign for Children
Kids in Danger
March of Dimes
Minnesota Department of Health
National Association of County and City Health Officials
Ohio Public Health Association
Partnership for Prevention
Public Citizen
U.S. PIRG
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council

 

Comments on proposed rule to allow FDA to regulate all tobacco products

Division of Dockets Management
Food and Drug Administration
5630 Fishers Lane, Room 1061 (HFA-305)
Rockville, Maryland 20852

August 8, 2014

Comments of members of the Patient, Consumer, and Public Health Coalition
On proposed Deeming Rule
Deeming Tobacco Products To Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act; Regulations on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products and Required Warning Statements for Tobacco Products; Extension of Comment Period
Docket No. FDA-2014-N-0189

As members of the Patient, Consumer, and Public Health Coalition we are writing to comment on various aspects of the proposed rule to extend FDA’s jurisdiction to tobacco (including made or derived from tobacco) products other than cigarettes, including e-cigarettes. It is essential that the proposed rule be strengthened, since nicotine is highly addictive.

1.      We strongly oppose exempting any cigars from the rule, including those designated as “premium.”  According to the FDA’s deeming rule, “a large cigar may contain as much tobacco as a whole pack of cigarettes” and “nicotine levels in cigar smoke can be up to 8 times higher than levels in cigarette smoke.”  We concur with the FDA that “all cigars are harmful and potentially addictive,” and this is true regardless of their price, the size of the manufacturer, and whether or not they are handmade. In addition, providing cigars special treatment encourages cigarette and other tobacco-related product manufacturers to continue to misclassify products that are actually cigarettes as cigars, in order to take advantage of this regulatory loophole.

2.      We also strongly oppose exempting or weakening the rules for smaller manufacturers or manufacturer of “premium” tobacco products, regardless of their so-called “unique challenges.” As noted above, cigars can be more dangerous than cigarettes.  Regardless of the cost or whether they are manufactured on a small scale, cigars have large-scale, long-term health consequences.

3.      The FDA’s proposed rule does not go far enough to safeguard the health of young people. It proposes a national minimum age of 18 for the purchase of the newly deemed products, which we wholeheartedly endorse, but it permits sale through the internet where age verification is difficult if not impossible to enforce. For this reason, we urge the FDA to prohibit internet sales of the deemed products (and eventually all tobacco products), or  require sellers to adopt the same age verification procedures established under the 2009 Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act for internet sales of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco.

4.       The proposed rule does not go far enough to restrict the marketing and advertising of e-cigarettes and cigars to minors. The number of middle and high school students who reported ever using e-cigarettes doubled between 2011 and 2012; and high school boys are just as likely to smoke cigars as they are cigarettes (16.4% vs. 16.5%). E-cigarettes, cigars and other newly deemed tobacco products should be kept behind store counters just like cigarettes.  They should not be displayed in the open, like the candy that many of these newer tobacco products try to emulate, with flavors like “Cinnamon Apple Crunch,” “Tahitian Punch,” and “Iced Berry.

The proposed rule permits self-service displays, does not prohibit low-cost, mini packs of cigars (that are obviously more affordable to children) and also allows brand sponsorship of concerts or sporting events popular with teenagers. These should all be strictly prohibited. Moreover, the FDA has not proposed limiting the advertising of the deemed products the way cigarettes and smokeless tobacco advertising has been limited. By allowing unfettered advertisement of e-cigarettes and cigars, the FDA is ensuring that youth will continue to be exposed to ad campaigns as effective as the ones in years past, which equated cigarette use with glamour, sex appeal, and cartoon characters like Joe Camel.

5.      We strongly support the FDA’s proposal to include health warnings about nicotine addiction on all nicotine-containing tobacco products, including e-cigarettes and cigars. We also support the FDA proposal to require that all cigars, including premium cigars, carry additional rotating health warnings on the risk of mouth and throat cancer; the risk of lung cancer and heart disease; the risk of lung cancer and heart disease from secondhand smoke; and stating that cigars are not a safe alternative to cigarettes. However, we strongly urge the FDA to include a fifth warning on the increased risk of infertility, stillbirth and low birth weight. This is particularly important, given the growing popularity of cigars among teenagers and the fact that teenage girls and young women have the highest rates of smoking during pregnancy (16.6% for girls 15-19 and 18.6% for women 20-24 in 2005). We also urge the FDA to revert to the 12-month compliance period (from the date of the final rule) which was changed after OMB review to an unacceptably long 24 months.

According to the CDC’s June 2014 report, nearly one-quarter of all male high school seniors smoke cigars (23%). To save lives, the FDA should mandate its proposed warning about nicotine addiction for all tobacco products; require all cigar manufacturers to rotate all five of the warnings that the FTC imposed on seven cigar manufacturers in 2000; and stipulate that all warnings must be in effect no later than 12 months from the final rule.

6.      We also urge the FDA to strengthen the proposed rule regarding characterizing flavors in cigars or e-cigarettes.  Cigarettes, for instance, can only be sold with tobacco-flavor or menthol flavor; the newly deemed products should be held to the same standard as they are similarly addictive, nicotine-containing products. More than 80% of adult cigarette smokers began smoking before the age of 18; flavors like “bubble gum” and “banana split” are specifically designed to appeal to children and teens and attract people who otherwise would not use a tobacco product.

The bottom line regarding flavored nicotine products: any flavor that makes the use of tobacco products more palatable should be banned. If a major benefit of e-cigarettes is to cut back on regular cigarette use, then those buying e-cigarettes will not be seeking candy or fruit flavors.  These flavored options clearly promote the use of tobacco products by new customers.

7.      The proposed rule does not mention requiring child-resistant packaging of liquid nicotine for use in e-cigarettes. Given the alarming rise in nicotine poisonings resulting from children coming into contact with “e-juice,” FDA should issue a proposed rule to prevent this public health problem.

8.      The FDA is proposing a premarket review requirement for all newly deemed products, while recommending that manufacturers have 24 months from the final rule to file substantial equivalence and new product applications. This would allow manufacturers to keep existing products on the market and introduce new deemed products for two full years following the promulgation of the final rule. It would also allow products for which an application has been submitted to stay on the market unless or until FDA denies it. These loopholes are unacceptable, given that there has already been a 3-year delay in issuing the deeming rule, giving companies more than enough time to prepare for regulatory requirements. To reduce any further delay, the FDA  should: a) issue a final rule within a year of the proposed rule’s issuance, and no later than April 25, 2015, and b) shorten the period for submitting new application or proving substantial equivalence to one year from the final rule.

The Tobacco Control Act (TCA) was enacted in 2009 to give FDA the authority to prevent and control tobacco use. The deeming rule is meant to extend that authority so as to protect children and adults from the harms of cigars and e-cigarettes. We recommend further strengthening the deeming rule in the ways described above and/or concurrently issuing additional proposed rules. The FDA’s mission is to protect and advance public health, and unfortunately the proposed rule falls short.

American Medical Women’s Association
Annie Appleseed Project
Breast Cancer Action
Cancer Prevention and Treatment Fund
Connecticut Center for Patient Safety
National Alliance for Hispanic Health
National Consumers League
National Organization for Women
Our Bodies Ourselves
Women Advocating Reproductive Safety
WomenHeart

The Patient, Consumer, and Public Health Coalition can be reached through Paul Brown at (202) 223-4000 or at pb@center4research.org 

Testimony of Dr. Anna E. Mazzucco, scientific advisor, on Ablatherm ultrasound treatment for prostate cancer

July 30, 2014

My name is Dr. Anna Mazzucco.  Thank you for the opportunity to speak today on behalf of the Cancer Prevention and Treatment Fund.   After completing my Ph.D. at Harvard Medical School, I conducted research at the National Cancer Institute.  Those are the perspectives I bring today.

Our research center conducts research, analyzes data in the research literature, and then explains the evidence of risks and benefits to policymakers and consumers.  Our president is on the Board of Directors of the Alliance for a Stronger FDA, which is a nonprofit dedicated to increasing the resources that the FDA needs to do its job.  Our organization does not accept funding from medical device companies, and therefore I have no conflicts of interest.

Prostate cancer is a very common cancer and all the current treatments have serious side effects that harm men’s quality of life.  The question today is whether the Ablatherm high-intensity focused ultrasound device is safe and effective for the treatment of low-risk, localized prostate cancer.  Most men diagnosed with localized, low-risk prostate cancer will not die from prostate cancer, but from something else.  Recent studies support active surveillance as a very reasonable option for these patients, since interventions do not improve overall survival and often harm quality-of-life.  The decision to treat low-risk early-stage prostate cancer, if at all, is already a challenging one for both patients and clinicians.  They deserve to be able to make important decisions which can affect quality-of-life for years to come based on solid scientific information.

For these reasons, any proposed treatment for this patient group must provide solid research evidence about the risks and benefits, so that patients and their families can make an informed decision.  I think we can agree that a new device, such as this ultrasound device, will not truly benefit patients unless it demonstrates a superior safety and quality-of-life profile.  Or, if you believe that options are good, at least the evidence should be solid that it provides an equally safe and effective result.

This is not the case with the Ablatherm ultrasound device.

First of all, we know almost nothing about its safety or effectiveness because the company has provided registry data on 62 patients, and of these, safety data were provided for more than 3 months for only 35 patients.  As the FDA noted in its executive summary, this is a very small number of patients to assess the safety of a treatment which could be used for thousands of patients.

In our opinion, the FDA should not even ask for your advice for a device studied on so few patients, given that other alternatives are available.

The lack of long-term safety data is especially important because on the average, a man diagnosed with prostate cancer will live at least 15 years before he will die of something other than prostate cancer.

Another methodological problem is that the patients whose safety was studied is not identical to the patients analyzed for effectiveness.  In fact, the two patient groups differ in several clinically meaningful ways, including age and concomitant therapy.  Patients and physicians need to be able to consider both the risks and benefits of any treatment together as it relates to their particular situation.

Despite these shortcomings, the sponsor attempted to make cross-study comparisons between this safety cohort and the radical prostatectomy arm of the PIVOT trial.  As the FDA scientists pointed out, unlike the Ablatherm data, the safety analysis from the PIVOT trial was not limited to a low-risk group, but included all risk groups, and the two trials also had completely different follow-up schedules.  These differences make any comparisons between these two groups completely meaningless.

The sponsor also attempted to perform a second safety analysis using the single arm of the incomplete Ablatherm IDE trial, again attempting to cross-compare to the PIVOT study.  This is also highly problematic for all the reasons stated by FDA scientists in their executive summary, including inability to compensate for differences in prognostic factors, follow-up schedules, and clinical endpoints.

As FDA scientists also noted, it could have been informative to compare the safety profile of Ablatherm to the active surveillance arm of the PIVOT trial, as that is a common approach to clinical management of this patient group.  But this was not done, and is impossible to do because of insufficient information.  Therefore, we are asked to judge the safety of this device with very little data indeed.

Despite these complications, several observations about the safety of the Ablatherm device can be made.

As you all know, quality-of life-is a particular problem for men treated for prostate cancer.  Two years after being treated with Ablatherm, 43.7% of patients still had erectile dysfunction and 11.1% still had incontinence.

There is no high-quality evidence of effectiveness either.  The only data are cross-study comparisons with the PIVOT study.  The primary efficacy endpoint was 8 year metastasis-free survival.  As the FDA scientists pointed out, due to the low event rate of metastasis in this low-risk patient group, and the high likelihood that these patients will not die of prostate cancer, this surrogate endpoint has little value.  Furthermore, attempting a cross-study comparison of a time-to-event endpoint, when the trials had different bone scan schedules, is again highly questionable.

The FDA scientists also highlight the fact that in the PIVOT trial being used here, radical prostatectomy was not superior to active surveillance in terms of metastasis  — or overall survival.

In other words, it makes no sense to try to prove that this new device is equal to surgical treatment regarding metastasized cancer when the surgical treatment is NO BETTER THAN NO TREATMENT.

The FDA scientists also point out similar methodological challenges comparing the Ablatherm data and registry and meta-analysis data from cryotherapy studies.

In summary, we simply do not have any properly controlled clinical data to support either the safety or effectiveness of the Ablatherm device.  Only 1 % of medical devices go through the PMA approval process.  The goal is to provide solid scientific evidence to prove safety and effectiveness so that patients and their physicians can make treatment decisions which can affect quality-of-life for years.   Registry data of only 62 patients, no minority patients, with no control group, and only 35 with safety data past 3 months is completely inadequate.  I can’t stress that enough.

We respectfully urge the committee to recommend that FDA reject this PMA application until better quality data are available.

 

Comment:

The FDA advisory panel voted against approval for the Ablatherm device, expressing concerns about lack of data on safety and effectiveness.

Click here to see our testimony slides.

 

 

Testimony of Dr. Anna Mazzucco on morcellation devices for uterine fibroid removal

Testimony of Dr. Anna E. Mazzucco
Obstetrics and Gynecology Devices Panel of the Medical Devices Advisory Committee
July 11, 2014

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today on behalf of the Cancer Prevention and Treatment Fund. My name is Dr. Anna Mazzucco, and after completing my Ph.D. in Cell and Developmental Biology from Harvard Medical School I conducted research at the National Cancer Institute. I speak from those perspectives today.

Our nonprofit organization conducts research, scrutinizes data in the research literature, and then explains the evidence of risks and benefits to patients and providers.  Our president is on the Board of Directors of the Alliance for a Stronger FDA, which is a nonprofit dedicated to increasing the resources that the FDA needs to do its job.  Our organization does not accept funding from medical device companies, and therefore I have no conflicts of interest.

About 600,000 hysterectomies are performed annually in the United States, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and approximately 65,000 myomectomies.  Of the hystectomies alone, the FDA estimates that 50,000 to 150,000 use power morcellation.  The FDA also estimates that 1 in 350 women undergoing hysterectomy or myomectomy for the treatment of fibroids has unsuspected uterine sarcoma which could be spread and worsened if a power morcellator is used.  Based on these numbers, as many as 400 women could have undiagnosed malignancy spread each year from hystectomy alone  — when you add myomectomies, it is probably much higher.  We agree with the FDA that there is currently no reliable method to distinguish between uterine fibroids and sarcoma before surgery.  Training physicians is, unfortunately, not the answer.

The estimate of one in 350 women undergoing surgery having an unsuspected uterine cancer is based on recent studies and is much higher than the 1-in-10,000 chance of undiagnosed cancer typically quoted to patients.  The FDA has also estimated that undiagnosed cancer will be spread or worsened by morcellation in 25-65% of cases.  The estimated 5-year survival is 60% for patients with stage I disease, compared with 22% for those with stage III and 15% for those with stage IV.

Minimally invasive surgery can offer many advantages to patients, but as you have heard at this meeting, the mortality benefits of such procedures are unclear. In contrast, it is absolutely certain that malignancy spread by morcellation can be life-threatening.  In light of these findings, we agree with the FDA’s statement in their safety communication that power morcellators should no longer be used during removal of uterine fibroids. 

The question is whether this warning from the FDA is enough to save lives?  Or, is this new evidence sufficient to alter the classification and labeling of these devices?

Power morcellators were originally approved as class II moderate -risk devices under the 510(k) process, which does not require clinical trials prior to allowing the device on the market.  It also does not require inspections to make sure the device is made and working as designed — such inspections are required for all prescription drugs.  Since morecellators were not studied in clinical trials, the risk of undiagnosed sarcoma spreading was not detected prior to clearance through the 510(K) pathway.  As a result, patients were irreparably harmed.  We’ve heard some of those tragic stories at this meeting.

Class III devices are defined as those which pose a significant risk of illness or injury, and require clinical testing for safety and efficacy.  Clearly, power morcellators meet this definition and should be classified as Class III devices.  Therefore, they should undergo clinical studies before any more patients are harmed.  Non-clinical performance testing studies are simply not sufficient to address these safety concerns.   If an adequate number of patients had been studied in clinical trials, we would have known years ago that morcellators could cause a fatal spread of uterine cancer.

I think everyone on this panel agrees that more research is needed. Clinical studies must evaluate risk mitigation strategies, such as use of a companion containment bag. However, as the FDA briefing material cites, there are adverse events associated with current specimen bags.  For this reason, bags need to be specifically designed for use with power morcellators specifically for uterine fibroids.  Surgical techniques must also be refined for use with these bags.

Clinical trials are also needed to improve the accuracy of patients’ diagnostic outcomes when morcellators are used.

After these studies are completed, the FDA should consider whether and under what circumstances power morcellators can be used for uterine fibroids.   On the basis of research, black box warnings must inform physicians and patients of the risk of spreading malignancy and the required risk mitigation strategies.  This label should also include the warning that these devices should never be used in patients with suspected malignancy.  Training and certification should also be required before physicians can use power morcellators to ensure that these risk mitigation techniques have been mastered.

As the FDA has stated in its summary for today’s meeting, the current voluntary reporting system for medical devices is underused, and thus underreports adverse events for all medical devices, including power morcellators. Unfortunately, surgeons and other medical personnel are not reporting these incidents to the FDA, and their reporting is voluntary, so they don’t have to.  On the other hand, the hospitals where these incidents occur are required to report them to the device companies, and the device companies are required to report them to the FDA.  For some reason, those reports were not being made either.  As a result, many more patients died before the risks of morcellation became known — primarily as the result of a physician whose life was put at risk when a morcellator used for a uterine fibroid resulted in Stage 4 uterine cancer.

We agree with the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists that a patient registry should be created to follow patients whose fibroids were previously removed with the assistance of power morcellation to more scientifically monitor their health outcomes. But, that is not enough.  And the current FDA warnings are not enough.

We need higher standards to ensure that morcellation devices are safe and effective, and that require clinical trials with sufficient numbers of patients to determine the risks of rare but fatal outcomes.

Cancer Prevention and Treatment Fund joins more than 3 dozen groups in supporting bills that ban hormone chemicals from food and beverage cans

Read the text of the letter, signed by dozens of health and cancer related organizations, below:

July 9, 2014

The Honorable Lois Capps

2231 Rayburn House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Grace Meng

1317 Longworth House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Capps and Representative Meng,

The undersigned organizations are pleased to express support for the Ban Poisonous Additives Act of 2014 (S. 2572/H.R. 5033). By banning bisphenol A (BPA) in food packaging and requiring the FDA to review the safety of other chemicals in food packaging, your legislation is an essential step toward improving the health of all Americans.

Most people are exposed to BPA every day. According to the U.S Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, more than 93 percent of the public have detectable levels of BPA in their bodies. Although the presence of BPA in commonly used goods is shockingly prevalent, the average consumer is unaware of its potential danger or what products to avoid.

BPA is the building block for polycarbonate plastic and used in the epoxy resin linings of food cans. More than 300 independent human and laboratory studies have found evidence that BPA exposure at very low doses is linked to a staggering number of health problems, including breast and prostate cancer, obesity, attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder, altered development of the brain and immune system, lowered sperm counts and early-onset puberty.

BPA raises a particular concern for vulnerable populations such as women of childbearing age and young children. Even minuscule amounts – as small as a few parts per billion or parts per trillion – have been shown to cross the placenta and disrupt normal prenatal development. In addition, workers exposed to BPA in the process of making and packing food cans are also at risk.

Twelve states have already adopted legislation to ban BPA from baby bottles and sippy cups, and 3 of those states also banned BPA from infant formula and baby food. Following the lead of these states and a long list of retailers and manufacturers that banned BPA in food containers for young children, including CVS, Gerber, Kroger, Safeway and Toys R Us, the FDA ended its authorization of BPA in baby bottles and sippy cups in July, 2012. A year later, in response to a petition from then Rep. Markey, the FDA also banned the use of BPA in infant formula packaging.

Banning BPA in the packaging of young children’s food is critical; however, to fully protect children from exposure to BPA and other chemicals of concern, we need to protect pregnant women and all of the foods that pregnant women and young children may ingest. Your legislation would also for the first time include workers as a vulnerable population that must be considered when the FDA reviews the safety of the chemicals in food packaging.

Americans expect and believe that our government is safeguarding their health and the health of their families from dangerous chemical exposures, and your legislation is an important step in that direction. We applaud your leadership on this issue and look forward to working with you to protect the public health by banning BPA from all food and beverage containers and requiring the FDA to ensure the safety of other food contact substances.

Sincerely,

Alaska Community Action on Toxics

Alliance of Nurses for Healthy Environments

American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists

American Nurses Association

Black Women for Wellness

Breast Cancer Action

Breast Cancer Fund

Cancer Prevention and Treatment Fund

Center for Effective Government

Center for Environmental Health

Center for Food Safety

Clean and Healthy New York

Clean Water Action

Coalition for a Safe and Healthy CT

Conservation Minnesota

Consumers Union

Ecology Center

Empire State Consumer Project

Environmental Health Strategy Center

Environmental Working Group

Greenpeace

Health Care Without Harm

Healthy Child Healthy World

Healthy Legacy Coalition

Huntington Breast Cancer Action Coalition

League of Conservation Voters

Learning Disabilities Association of America

MomsRising

Mossville Environmental Action Now

National WIC Association

Physicians for Social Responsibility

SafeMinds

Safer Chemicals, Healthy Families

San Francisco Bay Area Physicians for Social Responsibility

Science and Environmental Health Network

TEDX, The Endocrine Disruption Exchange

WE ACT for Environmental Justice

Women’s Voices for the Earth

 

Testimony of Dr. Anna E. Mazzucco to FDA advisory committee on olaparib

June 25, 2014

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today on behalf of the Cancer Prevention and Treatment Fund. My name is Dr. Anna Mazzucco, and after completing my Ph.D. in Cell and Developmental Biology from Harvard Medical School I conducted research at the National Cancer Institute. I speak from those perspectives today.

Our nonprofit organization conducts research, scrutinizes data in the research literature, and then explains the evidence of risks and benefits to patients and providers.  Our president is on the Board of Directors of the Alliance for a Stronger FDA, which is a nonprofit dedicated to increasing the resources that the FDA needs to do its job.  Our organization does not accept funding from pharmaceutical companies, and therefore I have no conflicts of interest.

Maintenance therapy for ovarian cancer patients is vital to extending the recovery time between chemotherapeutic regimens and preserving the efficacy of those agents.  Under consideration today is whether there is sufficient evidence at this time to approve olaparib for a maintenance therapy indication for platinum-sensitive high-grade relapsed serous ovarian cancer.

The goal of maintenance therapy is to extend the time between therapeutic intervals with an optimal risk-benefit ratio.  Otherwise, these patients would not be taking any medication during this time and need this period to recover before additional chemotherapy is needed.  Therefore safety, efficacy, and quality-of-life measures are defining features of maintenance therapy.

Afterreviewing the study evidence, we have three major concerns about olaparib, which were also raised by the FDA.

Firstly, we are concerned about the reliability of the progression-free survival benefit of olaparib, especially since there was no improvement in overall survival during Study 19.

Secondly, we are concerned about the safety profile of olaparib in the context of maintenance therapy. Olaparib-treated patients were almost twice as likely to experience a serious adverse event, in addition to the potentially elevated occurrence of myelodysplastic syndrome orAML.

Lastly, we are concerned that there is not enough evidence of efficacy and low toxicity to ensure that use of olaparib will not compromise patient response to subsequent therapy, which is critical to successful maintenance therapy.

Previous studies of first-line therapy for ovarian cancer suggested that progression-free survival can be predictive of overall survival.  However, a recent paper by the Society of Gynecologic Oncology cautioned against extrapolation of progression-free survival to presumed overall survival benefit in the context of prolonged post-progression survival and multiple lines of treatment.

I’m sure we all agree with the FDA that overall survival is clearly the most significant efficacy measure.  Progression-free survival may only be an acceptable efficacy endpoint when certain criteria are met.  These criteria include low toxicity and efficacy which is both truly predictive of clinically significant benefit and is of robust magnitude, in this particular case, an extension of progression-free survival by six months or more.

Given these stipulations, the seven month extension of progression-free survival in gBRCAm patients may meet a minimal efficacy threshold, but there are strong concerns about the reliability of this observed effect.  In the exploratory analysis conducted by the FDA within the placebo arm, the gBRCAwt/vus population unexpectedly had a superior progression-free survival outcome when compared to the gBRCAm population.  This suggests that the placebo-treated gBRCAm population may have “underperformed”, meaning that the progression-free survival improvement observed in the gBRCAm population may be overestimated.  The SOLO-2 trial currently underway is powered to precisely detect changes in the hazard ratio.  That data is critical to clarifying the potential progression-free survival benefit of olaparib due to this uncertainty.

While the patient-reported FACT-O quality-of-life measures did not indicate detriment, there were significantly increased adverse events with olaparib treatment, including a 2-fold increase in nausea, a 4-fold increase in anemia, a 2-fold increased incidence of various infections, and a near 2-fold increase in gastrointestinal disorders.

As the FDA stated, the patient-reported measures may not capture all possible negative effects of olaparib treatment, and any reported improvements could also reflect cessation of previous platinum treatments.

In addition, approximately four times as many patients in the olaparib-treated arm versus the placebo-treated arm underwent dose reductions, and about six times as many underwent dose interruptions due to adverse events.  Many adverse events also lasted longer in the olaparib-treated arm. There were ten adverse event categories which lasted more than a month longer for olaparib-treated patients, including abdominal, joint, musculoskeletal pain and nausea.  For these reasons, we are concerned that olaparib does not meet the low toxicity and quality-of-life parameters that are essential in the maintenance therapy setting.

The ongoing phase III SOLO-2 trial has the potential to clarify the potential progression-free survival benefit of olaparib, in addition to providing an additional analysis of overall survival and quality-of-life measures.

The results of SOLO-2 are needed In order to be able to guarantee patients an effective maintenance therapy that is not likely to jeopardize their quality-of-life and overall prognosis.  Therefore, we urge the committee to delay approval of olaparib until sufficient evidence has been provided.

Members of the Patient, Consumer, and Public Health Coalition strongly support the Research for All Act of 2014

To view as a PDF, click here.

June 5, 2014

The Honorable Jim Cooper
1536 Longworth HOB
Washington, DC 20515

Re: Members of the Patient, Consumer, and Public Health Coalition strongly support the Research for All Act of 2014.

Dear Congressman Cooper,

As members of the Patient, Consumer, and Public Health Coalition, we strongly support the Research for All Act.  It would require the FDA to develop policies to ensure that clinical trials for medical products granted expedited approval are sufficient in design and size to determine the safety and effectiveness for men and women, using subgroup analysis.  The Act also increases the study of female animals, tissues, and cells in basic research conducted or supported by NIH.

This legislation is needed because most medical research used as the basis of FDA approval decisions focuses on men. For example, although cardiovascular disease is the leading killer of women and men, only one-third of subjects in clinical trials are female.  Even when studies do include women, 70% fail to report outcomes by sex.  Insufficient inclusion in clinical trials, failure to conduct appropriate subgroup analysis, and lack of publically available information puts women at risk when they use FDA-approved diagnostics and treatments.  As an example, the unique way women metabolize drugs was not considered when the dosage for Ambien sleeping pills was determined.  As a result, the recommended dosage was approximately twice as high for women as it should have been.  It took many years before the FDA finally corrected the label to reflect different dosages for men and women.

Expedited pathways are designed to make important new drugs readily available; it is essential that the companies utilizing these pathways ensure that their products are safe and effective for women as well as men.

Men will also benefit by requiring clinical trials to report outcomes by sex. Low-dose aspirin has different preventive effects in women and men; there is now evidence that a diabetes drug may lower a women’s risk of heart failure but increase men’s risk; and some common blood pressure and antibiotic medications may be less effective for men.  These potential problems are not identified if men and women are analyzed together rather than separately.

Thank you for sponsoring this legislation. The Research for All Act will improve health outcomes for women and men by more precisely ensuring the proper indication and dosage.

 

American Medical Student Association
American Medical Women’s Association
Annie Appleseed Project
Breast Cancer Action
Connecticut Center for Patient Safety
Consumers United for Evidence-based Healthcare (CUE)
Jacobs Institute of Women’s Health
National Center for Health Research
National Physicians Alliance
National Women’s Health Network
Our Bodies Ourselves
Ovarian Cancer Alliance of San Diego
The TMJ Association
Center for Science and Democracy at the Union of Concerned Scientists
WoodyMatters
WomenHeart

 

The Patient, Consumer, and Public Health Coalition can be reached through Paul Brown at (202) 223-4000 or pb@center4research.org