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Municipal and Schools Budgets Proposed for FY ’19-20, Public Comments Focus on Turf, Ice Rink

Greenwich Free Press: January 25, 2019.


On Thursday night Greenwich First Selectman Peter Tesei presented his recommended budget for the fiscal year starting July 1, 2019 and ending on June 30, 2020 to the BET.

After his presentation and that of the Schools Superintendent Mayo, there were about 90 minutes of public testimony which primarily focused on opposition to artificial turf. Several residents said they favor investing in grass fields with better drainage. There was also vocal support for a new Dorothy Hamill Ice Rink.

Diana Zuckerman, a 30 year health policy scientist and president of the National Center for Health Research, traveled from Washington DC to testify about artificial turf.

“Artificial turf companies say there is no evidence that the fields can cause cancer,” she said. “This is often misunderstood to mean turf is safe. It takes many years to conclude that long-term exposure is safe, and there’s no such evidence for artificial turf. The materials contain carcinogens. Day after day, year after year, this increases the chances of cancer in children and later on as adults. Why spend millions on turf that is less safe than well designed grass fields?” she asked.

Rick Loh from the Parks & Rec Advisory Board said of the Hamill Rink project,” It has taken many years to see these numbers in the budget. Hopefully you’ll keep them where they are. There has been a number of people working on this for a number years. RFPs have come back and we’re ready to take it to the next step.”

[…]

During the public hearing, Susan Rudolph said she had studied the artificial turf industry, which she described as large, rich and powerful.

“Plastic grass looks pretty but is made of petroleum,” said Ms. Zuckerman, president of National Center for Health Research. “Turf companies hide what is in it. There are no safety tests to prove artificial turf is safe for long term use. Meanwhile they advise parents how to reduce exposure. I’ve seen firsthand that officials in school systems have been erroneously assured that artificial turf is safe. Greenwich can set an important example by protecting children from artificial turf.”

Dr. David R Brown, public health toxicologist, who spent part of his career at the CDC, cited a March 2018 study of 200 soccer players with cancer. He said most of them were goalies and they suffered from Lymphomas, Sarcomas, Testicular cancer, Thyroid cancer, Brain cancer, and Lung cancer.

Dr. Patricia Taylor said that at Guilford High School, an artificial turf failed after it was installed. She said Malone and MacBroom received $87,000 for design, inspection and contract management. The field cost $1.15 million to install.

“They chose Envirofill and in 2016 the field was installed. It was used starting in 2017. Defects were noticed in 2018,” she said. “The field was literally coming apart at the seams. It cost $40,000 for consultant to look at it. And it was not in use as of May 2018.”

Taylor said that field was determined to have failed due to extreme temperatures and a drainage issue, and that there was disagreement about who was liable. Ultimately, she said the case was settled confidentially.

“The field will be rebuilt, but will not be ready for spring 2019,” she said. “Companies like Malone and MacBroom make assurances about safety, but human health risk studies have not been done.”

Taylor warned the BET that if the Town uses artificial turf to cover contaminated soil at Greenwich High School, the Town may have liability. “Plastic and rubber absorb hitchhikers – chemicals in the environment around them.”

“Synthetic turf fields are also flammable,” she added. “So they’re fenced and keep neighbors off, access is restricted and the it becomes a source of revenue.

Mary Jones with the Toxins Action Center in Boston said injuries such as burns and abrasions are more common than with real grass. “Grass turf is growing in popularity across the country.  The residents of Greenwich are not alone in their preference for grass for their playing fields. Greenwich can continue to be a leader in sustainability in Connecticut.”[…]

See the full article here.

Comments on Tobacco Control Efforts in the U.S.-United Kingdom Trade Agreement

January 15, 2019

Re: Docket No. USTR-2018-0036
Mr. Edward Gresser
Chair of the Trade Policy Staff Committee
Office of the United States Trade Representative
600 17th Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20508

Dear Mr. Gresser:

We are pleased to submit these comments in the above-designated docket. Our organizations are public health and medical organizations which are actively engaged in efforts to eliminate the disease and death caused by the use of tobacco products in the United States and throughout the world.

As you prepare to negotiate a trade and investment agreement with the United Kingdom, we urge that you ensure that the agreement provides the protections necessary to enable both countries to adopt public health measures to protect their citizens from the death and disease caused by tobacco products without facing the risk of litigation by the tobacco companies. It is essential that any agreement recognize the unique harms tobacco products cause, and includes provisions to ensure that the United States and the United Kingdom do not face the threat of investor litigation from the tobacco industry.

Tobacco products are the only consumer products that kill when used exactly as intended. Each year more than 480,000 Americans die from tobacco use. Globally, tobacco kills more than 7 million people annually, and without effective tobacco control policies to reduce consumption, one billion people will die from using tobacco products this century. For these reasons, tobacco products are the only consumer product subject to a treaty specifically designed to prevent and reduce their use — the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.

Countries around the globe are implementing tobacco control policies from graphic health warning labels to plain packaging. The tobacco industry has aggressively responded by using investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions in trade and investment agreements to both threaten and file legal challenges against countries’ tobacco policies. Despite not prevailing on its investment claims, the tobacco industry has long used legal threats and challenges to intimidate governments from moving forward with policies to prevent or reduce tobacco consumption. The tobacco industry’s behavior is a real and direct threat to public health.

The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) significantly limits the tobacco industry’s ability to initiate disputes challenging tobacco control measures by eliminating ISDS between the U.S. and Canada and limiting ISDS claims between the U.S. and Mexico for the majority of industries, including the tobacco industry, to direct expropriation and discrimination claims brought under the grounds of National Treatment or Most-Favored Nation Treatment.

Any ISDS provision included in a U.S. – U.K. trade agreement should prohibit challenges from private tobacco companies to tobacco control measures to reduce tobacco use. Given the experience of the tobacco companies using the investor-state provisions in other agreements to challenge tobacco control measures, this protection is critical. It is also particularly important because the U.S. is moving forward with adopting graphic warning labels to accompany textual warnings that together will cover 50% of the front and back of a cigarette pack. Also note that the United States has previously defended a tobacco-related NAFTA claim in Grand River v. United States, which, despite the United States’ prevailing on the seven-year long claim, cost the taxpayers millions of dollars to litigate. Protecting the right of the United States and the United Kingdom to implement tobacco control policies free from the threat of tobacco industry ISDS challenges is critical for both nations to protect the health of their citizens.

As you develop your negotiating objectives for a U.S. – U.K. trade and investment agreement, we respectfully request that you recognize that the agreement must set the example for a 21st century agreement by, at a minimum, recognizing the unique harms caused by tobacco products and preventing the tobacco industry from using the agreement to challenge U.S. or U.K. actions to reduce the use of tobacco products.

Sincerely,

Action on Smoking & Health
Allergy & Asthma Network
American Academy of Family Physicians
American Academy of Otolaryngology—Head and Neck Surgery
American Academy of Pediatrics
American Association for Dental Research
American Cancer Society Cancer Action Network
American College of Physicians
American Heart Association
American Lung Association
American Medical Association
American Psychological Association
American Public Health Association
American Society of Addiction Medicine
Association of Schools and Programs of Public Health
Association of Women’s Health, Obstetric and Neonatal Nurses
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids
Cancer Prevention and Treatment Fund
Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America
Eta Sigma Gamma – National Health Education Honorary
March of Dimes
National African American Tobacco Prevention Network
National Association of County & City Health Officials
National Association of School Nurses
National Network of Public Health Institutes
Oncology Nursing Society
Society for Cardiovascular Angiography and Interventions
Society for Public Health Education
The Society of State Leaders of Health and Physical Education

Health Care Industry Spends $30 Billion a Year on Marketing

Liz Szabo, Kaiser Health News: January 8, 2019.


Spending on health care marketing nearly doubled from 1997 to 2016, soaring to at least $30 billion a year, according to a study published Tuesday in JAMA.

The FDA is Still Letting Doctors Implant Untested Devices into Our Bodies

Jeanne Lenzer and Shannon Brownlee, Washington Post: January 4, 2019.


Ten years ago, Kathleen Yaremchuk raced to the bedside of a patient inexplicably gasping for breath. Chair of the department of otorhinolaryngology (ear, nose and throat) at Henry Ford Hospital in Detroit, Yaremchuk performed an emergency tracheotomy on the woman, cutting a hole in her windpipe, inserting a breathing tube and saving her life. When Yaremchuk began getting more calls over the following months for mysterious cases of respiratory distress, she launched a study to figure out what was going on.

All these patients, it turned out, had a small device implanted in the top of their spines to relieve pain. The object, used to hold a protein that stimulates bone growth, was cleared for sale by the Food and Drug Administration in 2003 without clinical testing in humans. When Yaremchuk and her colleagues reviewed the records of all 260 patients implanted with the device at Henry Ford Hospital between 2004 and 2009, they found that a significant number developed airway obstruction, trouble swallowing and respiratory failure, in some cases leading to death.

The neck implant is just one of the products associated over the past decade with 1.7 million injuries and more than 80,000 deaths. A searing global investigation last year by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists places much of the blame on significant failings in the FDA’s oversight. The agency’s laissez faire attitude has resulted in artificial hips that cause cobalt poisoning (which can damage the heart and brain); surgical mesh that cuts through flesh and organs, causing infections and hemorrhage; and defibrillators that repeatedly shock patients beyond human endurance. Safety problems have led to recalls of devices implanted in hundreds of thousands of people. And the devices can be difficult or impossible to remove if they go bad. No wonder many patient advocates cheered when the FDA announced in November that it planned to make “transformative” changes in the way more than 80 percent of medical devices are cleared for sale in the United States. Some 32 million Americans walk around with such products in their bodies.

But the promised transformation is mere window dressing. Two key loopholes still exist, allowing most products to be approved for sale without clinical trials in humans. Although the FDA insists that high-risk devices undergo “stringent” testing to win approval, few actually do. A recent study, for example, found that only 5 percent of the highest-risk implantable cardiac devices were subjected to clinical trials on par with the testing required for drug approval.

In 1976, when medical devices first came under the regulatory control of the FDA, the agency simply grandfathered in all devices that were already on the market. Under this provision, known as the 510(k) pathway, new artificial joints, cataract lens implants and thousands of other devices developed after 1976 can win approval for sale (or “clearance” in FDA parlance) if the product is shown to have “substantial equivalence” to a previously cleared “predicate” device.” Four out of five devices are cleared for sale this way. Of those, at least 95 percent were cleared without clinical studies, according to research by Diana Zuckerman and her colleagues at the National Center for Health Research.

For some devices, that makes sense. You don’t need a clinical trial to test a new tongue depressor or hospital stretcher. But the agency also lets higher-risk devices through based on predicate devices, some of which have been recalled for safety problems. A recent study by researchers at the University of Oxford discovered that 16 percent of surgical meshes cleared for sale in the United States between 2013 and 2015 were based on products previously removed from the market because of serious complications. When one of us asked the FDA how this could happen, officials answered that the agency doesn’t evaluate the performance of the predicate when clearing devices for sale, just that there is (or was) a predicate.

According to the FDA, the “most impactful” change it is considering is recommending (not mandating) that companies cite predicate devices no older than 10 years. Yet device-makers could still cite predicates that were themselves based on earlier devices that may date back well past 10 years, something the FDA acknowledged in an email to us, stating that “devices cleared under a 510(k), regardless of how long the predicate has been on the market, have met the 510(k) regulatory review standard.”

The second loophole is the supplement pathway, which applies to new versions of the highest-risk devices, such as artificial hips, deep brain stimulators and spine implants. This process allows manufacturers to inform the FDA that they want to market an updated version of a device with minor changes — once again, allowing them to circumvent clinical trials. Researchers at Harvard found that 99 percent (5,829 of 5,906) of implanted cardiac devices, such as pacemakers and defibrillators, were approved through the supplement pathway from 1979 to 2012.

The supplement pathway has led to a number of disasters, such as one involving Medtronic’s Sprint Fidelis defibrillators, which are implanted in the chest to shock the heart if it goes into a deadly rhythm known as ventricular fibrillation. The company told the FDA in 2003 that it had updated the device to use thinner electrical leads into the heart. But the new wires were prone to fracture, hitting some patients repeatedly with shocks when their hearts were fine, and not delivering shocks to others who needed them. Doctors put the Sprint Fidelis into Bridget Robb, a patient from Pennsylvania in her early 30s. It shocked her 31 times in a span of minutes in 2007. She said in congressional testimony that it felt like being shot in the chest by a cannon at close range.

By the time Medtronic recalled the defibrillator in 2007, about a quarter-million were in circulation worldwide. Individuals implanted with it live under a sword of Damocles: They risk electrocution and possible death if they leave the Sprint Fidelis alone — and they risk death if their heart stops and the product fails. If they choose to have it removed, they face a 12 to 16 percent rate of serious complications or death from the surgery, according to a study published in 2010 in the journal Circulation.

Cases like these have received widespread coverage in the press but have had virtually no effect on FDA policy. Even a damning 2011 report by the Institute of Medicine (requested by the FDA), which deemed the agency’s 501(k) pathway so flawed it should be thrown out, fell on deaf ears.

Part of the problem lies in whom the agency believes it serves. At a recent meeting in Utah, the FDA’s device director repeatedly referred to manufacturers as the agency’s “customers” and showed a slide proclaiming “90 percent customer satisfaction.” Another slide documented the agency’s shorter and shorter approval times over the past eight years. These might not be the priorities of patients and taxpayers if they knew how often devices go on to harm people.

The FDA has become a captive agency. In 2007, Congress passed the Medical Device User Fee Amendments (MDUFA), which requires manufacturers to pay for device approvals. (Similar legislation, the Prescription Drug User Fee Act, directs money from drug companies to the FDA.) By 2018, 35 percent of the FDA’s budget for regulating devices came directly from the companies that make them. Zuckerman says that to continue collecting user fees under the MDUFA, the agency has to meet “performance goals” for faster approvals — leaving less time to evaluate products before they go on the market. It’s an inherent conflict of interest exacerbated by the revolving door of directors and commissioners who come from industry to the FDA and then go back. Before being appointed by President Trump to head the agency, Scott Gottlieb was paid millions of dollars for consultancies, directorships and other ties with some 20 health-care companies. He is a vocal supporter of Trump’s deregulation drive, arguing in 2013 that “the FDA’s caution is hazardous to our health.”

This is not a new problem. Before Gottlieb, President Barack Obama appointed Margaret Hamburg, who was then a director of Henry Schein, a leading medical-device distributor, to head the FDA. And in 2005, President George W. Bush named Lester Crawford, who abruptly resigned after just two months and came under criminal investigation for making false statements to Congress concealing his ties to companies the FDA regulates.

The relationship between the agency and the device industry is so cozy that in 2015, Rob Califf, then the FDA commissioner, met secretly with the Advanced Medical Technology Association (AdvaMed), the industry trade organization, to help craft the 21st Century Cures Act, which lowered the bar of evidence needed to approve devices even further.

Last fall, the FDA and AdvaMed were aware of the planned release of the Implant Files, the report by the investigative journalists’ consortium. AdvaMed executives were so concerned that they held a meeting to discuss strategies for dealing with the anticipated stories, which made headlines around the world in November. The executives promised their member companies that they would “hit back and hit back hard.” One day after the first reports were published, the FDA issued its “transformative” changes to the 510(k) pathway.

If Americans want devices that are safe and effective, they’ll need a new kind of regulation. First, the FDA should recategorize any implanted device as a high-risk or Class III product, which would subject it to rigorous clinical trials. Data from these studies should be made publicly available, or the manufacturer would forfeit the right to sell its product. And implanted devices should be entered into registries that track outcomes; patients should be given access to a website where they can immediately report problems and receive updates.

Lawmakers should also revive the congressional Office of Technology Assessment, which the House of Representatives killed in 1995, during a fit of anti-regulation insanity inspired by Newt Gingrich’s Contract With America. The office provided an invaluable service by independently assessing evidence for a wide range of technologies.

Finally, the FDA commissioner should be a civil servant without financial conflicts, not a political appointee (a practice started under Richard Nixon).

To do all of this, the FDA needs to overcome the constant threat of losing funding if it goes against the wishes of the industry it is supposed to regulate. Congress should repeal the MDUFA (and the prescription-drug equivalent) and fully fund the agency. Until the FDA requires clinical testing of implanted devices, as it does for drug approval, we simply won’t have the evidence to prove that a device is safe or effective.

See the original article here.

29-Year-Old Fitness Model Gets Breast Implants Removed after She Says the Silicone Gave Her Seven Years of ‘Brain Fog, Bald Spots and Rashes’

Mary Kekatos, Daily Mail: December 19, 2018.


A fitness blogger said she had her breast implants removed because the silicone was ‘poisoning’ her.

Sia Cooper, the 29-year-old behind the blog Diary of a Fit Mommy, revealed she got implants in October 2011 to boost her self-confidence after weight loss left her with small breasts.

However, over the next seven years, the Florida mother-of-two struggled with extreme fatigue, facial rashes, chest pain, brain fog and even hair loss.

post-explant, 2 weeks

After undergoing multiple blood tests, diagnostic tests and X-rays that came back negative, Cooper was convinced her symptoms were related to what described as  ‘breast implant illness’.

 

Patient Satisfaction After Breast Reconstruction with Implants Compared to Flap Procedures

 

For many women, breast reconstruction can be an important step in recovering physically and mentally after a mastectomy.  However, research shows less than half of mastectomy patients received the information and counseling necessary to make an informed decision regarding their reconstruction choice.

A 2018 study by Katherine Santosa and her colleagues found that patients who undergo autologous breast reconstruction (also called “flap” procedures), are generally more satisfied in the long-term than women who choose reconstruction with breast implants.  The study included 2,013 patients, 74% of whom got breast implants and 26% of whom had autologous reconstruction. Autologous tissue transfer refers to any procedure in which the body’s own tissue is used to reconstruct breasts. Surgeons take fat and other tissue from another part of a woman’s body, usually the abdomen, and move it to create breasts.

The researchers surveyed women on their quality of life 90 days before their mastectomy, and at 1, 2, 3, and 4 years after reconstruction. The survey included questions on four topics: Patients’ satisfaction with their breasts, emotional and social well-being, sexual well-being, and physical well-being. In the satisfaction with breasts category, women were asked questions about their breasts appearance, their satisfaction with breasts and how bras fit, and how the breasts feel to the touch. To understand women’s emotional and social well-being, researchers asked questions about body image and a woman’s confidence in social settings. Women were also asked about their sexual well-being, including questions about feelings of sexual attractiveness, sexual confidence, and comfort level during sex. Lastly, researchers asked women about their physical well-being, including information about pain, tightness, and any physical difficulty with performing daily activities.

Patients who chose autologous reconstruction reported higher satisfaction with their breasts than those who got breast implants. The women who had autologous reconstruction also reported greater emotional and social well-being and sexual well-being compared to before reconstruction. In contrast, patients who got breast implants reported worsened sexual well-being compared to before reconstruction.

The information from this study can provide useful information to patients and their doctors about patients’ likely quality of life following breast reconstruction with autologous or “flap” procedures compared to breast implants.

You can read a summary of the original article here.

Reference:

  1. Santosa, Katherine B et al. Long-term Patient-Reported Outcomes in Postmastectomy Breast Reconstruction. JAMA Surgery. 2018; 153(10): 891 – 899.

FDA Recommends “Modernizing” Review of Devices in Wake of Global Investigation

Jeanne Lenzer, The British Medical Journal: November 27, 2018


The US Food and Drug Administration is making changes to how medical devices are cleared for sale after a scathing investigation into the industry.

The global investigation into the medical device industry by journalists from 36 countries, including The BMJ, BBC Panorama, and the Guardian and led by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, unearthed thousands of documents to reveal rising numbers of malfunctions and injuries.

Scott Gottlieb, FDA commissioner, and Jeff Shuren, director of the Center of Devices and Radiological Health, said in a statement that there would be changes to the 510(k) pathway that is used to clear four in every five devices for sale. The pathway approves devices not on the basis of testing in humans but on how similar devices are to previous devices, called “predicates,” some of which were approved decades ago.

Gottlieb and Shuren said that … they were “encouraging” manufacturers to “use more modern predicates,” [….]

However, the reform didn’t go far enough, said Diana Zuckerman, epidemiologist and president of the National Center for Health Research in Washington, DC. She told The BMJ that using more “modern” predicates says nothing about safety or effectiveness. She said that “newer doesn’t mean better” and that “since less than 5% of 510(k) devices undergo any type of clinical trials, there’s no assurance that any devices cleared through that pathway are safe or effective.”

In 1996 the US Supreme Court concluded that “since the 510(k) process is focused on equivalence, not safety . . . if the earlier device poses a severe risk or is ineffective, then the later device may also be risky or ineffective.”

A recent study found that 16% of mesh clearances were based on recalled devices. When the FDA was asked why it cleared mesh implants on the basis of predicate devices that had been withdrawn because of safety concerns, the agency said that it didn’t evaluate the performance of predicate devices when clearing devices for sale.

A study of high risk implanted cardiac devices found that only 5% underwent clinical testing that even partly approximated the testing required for drug approvals.

Nor is safety surveillance reliable. A Government Accountability Office analysis found that 99% of device related “adverse events” were never reported to the FDA and that the “more serious the event, the less likely it was to be reported.”

Read the original article here.

NCHR Testimony on the Opioid Buprenorphine/Samidorphan for Depression

Stephanie Fox-Rawlings, PhD, National Center for Health Research: November 1, 2018


Thank you for the chance to speak today on behalf of the National Center for Health Research. I am Dr. Stephanie Fox-Rawlings. Our Center analyzes scientific and medical data to provide objective health information to patients, health professionals, and policy makers. We do not accept funding from drug and medical device companies, so I have no conflicts of interest. More about ibebet bet in nigeria

As we’ve heard today, depression is a serious health issue. However, FDA approval requires proof that new drugs are safe and effective. New drugs have to work to help patients.

I’ll focus on efficacy first. The evidence presented for buprenorphine/samidorphan (BUP/SAM) does not provide adequate evidence that it reduces depression more than placebo.

Two of the three trials designed to provide evidence of efficacy did not find any statistical benefit of the drug compared to placebo. The third trial, study 207, had a statistically significant reduction in depression on the MADRS for the 2mg/2mg dose. However, this trial also has major shortcomings. For example, it used the MADRS-6, which lacks important aspects of depression and therefore can’t prove efficacy.

Using the full MADRS, the only time the drug is more effective than placebo is for just a few weeks in the middle of a short trial. By the end of the trial, the placebo group was doing as well as the treatment group. This does not demonstrate a meaningful benefit for patients. And though statistically significant for that short time, treated patients improved less than 2 points more than placebo on a 60 point scale. This difference seems too small to be clinically meaningful for patients.

MADRS has clear standards for improvement. “Responders” are defined as those whose symptoms improve by at least 50%. Remission is defined by those scores are 10 or below on MADRS. Patients taking the drug were not more likely to be a responder or go into remission than patients taking placebo for any of the efficacy trials. This again raises questions about whether the benefit in study 207 is clinically meaningful compared to studies of other antidepressants. These trials may just be too short, but there needs to be confirmatory evidence that the statistically significant result is real.

Study 202 was designed as a proof of concept study and FDA points out that it can’t prove efficacy because it lacks the statistical controls to make sure that the difference did not occur by chance. Also, the relatively high dropout rate for patients in the drug arms could have a large effect on the results. We agree with the FDA reviewers that the lack of a dose response also raises red flags. If the drug is effective, the high dose (8mg/8mg) should at least show a statistical trend toward significance. It doesn’t.

As we all know, in studies of depression the placebo groups often do quite well. Placebo controls are essential because they help control for the natural ebb and flow of depression episodes. Instead, the sponsor tries to eliminate evidence of the placebo effect. Without the trial-long comparison of the placebo to drug arms, it is not possible to determine whether natural fluctuations in depression or the treatment are affecting the results.

There are concerns about safety.

The clinical trials included very few older patients. Older patients metabolize drugs more slowly and are more likely to have adverse reactions. They are also likely to be taking many other drugs that could interact with this drug.

Like all opioids, even ones with abuse-deterrent properties, this drug has the potential for misuse and abuse. This is a major concern because depressed patients are more likely to have substance abuse disorders and are at increased risk for opioid overdose.

In summary, the clinical trial data do not provide adequate evidence that BUP/SAM reduces the symptoms of depression. There are concerns about it potential for long-term harms to patients and others who might misuse or abuse it. BUP/SAM needs to provide strong evidence of efficacy before approval.

Although refractory depression is a serious condition, prescribing a treatment with unproven benefits and unknown risks is very dangerous. And, as you know, new drugs for depression tend to be more widely prescribed than the narrow indications that FDA approves. Approving this drug even for refractory depression could easily contribute greatly to our current opioid epidemic.

 

The joint Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee and the Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee voted against approval (21 against and 2 for).

Medical Device Dangers: FDA Facing Criticism Over Missed Signs

Today News: November 26, 2018.


Americans undergo hundreds of thousands of surgeries involving medical devices every year – but does the system that regulates the devices put patients at risk? An NBC News investigation, in conjunction with the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, takes a closer look at one type of hip device that caused a world of pain for patients, including former Olympic gymnast Mary Lou Retton. NBC’s Stephanie Gosk reports for TODAY. NCHR’s Jack Mitchell explains to the Today Show why metal on metal hip replacements were used in US after warnings were released in other countries. For more info check this Wien: 3 Tage lang sind Wetten und Glücksspiel, Online und Offline, Thema im Austria Center. – PRNET

See the original story here.

Breast Implant Injuries Hidden as Patients’ Questions Mount

Meghan Hoyer, Associated Press: November, 26 2018.


WASHINGTON (AP) — To all the world, it looked like breast implants were safe. From 2008 to 2015, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration publicly reported 200 or so complaints annually — a tiny fraction of the hundreds of thousands of implant surgeries performed each year.

Then last fall, something strange happened: Thousands of problems with breast implants flooded the FDA’s system. More than 4,000 injury reports filed in the last half of 2017. Another 8,000 in the first six months of 2018.

Suddenly, women like Jamee Cook had evidence suggesting their suffering might be linked to their breast implants. An emergency room paramedic, Cook had quit her job because of a vague but persistent array of health problems that stretched over a decade, including exhaustion, migraines, trouble focusing and an autoimmune disorder diagnosis.

Why had it taken so long for complaints like hers to see the light of day?

Makers of breast implants were required to track patients and their health. But for more than a decade, manufacturers with high numbers of recurring problems — in the case of implants, ruptures that required surgery to remove — were allowed to report issues in bulk, with one report standing in for thousands of individual cases and no way for the public to discern the true volume of incidents.

That agreement stood even as the FDA began closely monitoring a rare type of cancer and acknowledged in 2011 that it might be linked to breast implants.

“It looked like these devices had become safer, but they hadn’t,” Cook told The Associated Press. “The data was hidden. It’s a deceptive practice.”

Once Cook’s textured saline implants were removed, she said the majority of her symptoms disappeared. Her experiences prompted her to become a patient safety advocate, lobbying lawmakers and organizing groups of women online who have concerns about breast implants.

Public health advocates who’ve watched the debate over breast implant safety rage for nearly three decades say summary reporting is yet another way that information about the devices has been elusive for patients.

“They were told those devices were safe — the FDA would go back and say ‘We only have this many reports,’” said Madris Tomes, a former FDA staffer who founded a company to analyze medical device reports. “But data was coming in another way that wasn’t public. It leaves the patients demoralized — they don’t understand how many other people are suffering.”

The data came to light after the FDA instructed manufacturers in mid-2017 to go back and file individual reports in each case of patient injury, in response to a lawyer’s discovery that reports from his clients weren’t represented in the agency’s data. Patient advocates took up the issue, complaining about a lack of transparency and voicing concerns about a host of autoimmune problems they believed stemmed from their implants.

But even as the FDA was dealing with the problems of how breast implant manufacturers had used summary reporting, the agency was moving to expand device makers’ flexibility in how they report problems, saying it was trying to reduce the industry’s paperwork requirements.

This August, the agency began allowing roughly 90 percent of all medical devices — including all breast implants and more than 160 types of other high-risk implanted devices like artificial hips and replacement heart valves — to report malfunctions in a quarterly tally, instead of individually. They will not be able to report cases involving deaths or injuries that way, however.

The FDA rejected claims that expanding summary reporting could harm public health by making problems with devices less transparent, saying the plan “will also yield benefits . such as helping FDA process malfunction reports more efficiently and helping both FDA and the public more readily identify malfunction trends.”

FDA officials also said that the agency has closely monitored the breast implant industry in the past decade and issued updates about potential risks.

Two of the largest breast implant manufacturers, Mentor and Allergan, said they stood behind the safety of their products, citing years of studies that have led to inconclusive evidence that autoimmune problems are linked to breast implants.

“Our medical devices undergo extensive laboratory testing before they are submitted to government health experts for a science-based review,” Mentor spokeswoman Mindy Tinsley said. “Many of our devices undergo careful reviews by not just one, but multiple regulatory bodies around the world.”

Still, it can be hard for breast implant patients and advocates to track problems that do arise.

Insurance claims make no mention of the specific device or model implanted in a patient, and patients’ electronic health records aren’t required to record that either. In addition, products sold overseas can be renamed or carry a different model number, making international recalls or tracking across borders nearly impossible.

Meanwhile, the FDA’s main database on medical device problems, which requires manufacturers to report patient deaths and serious injuries to the government within 30 days, relies on hand-typed entries from a variety of people — from patients to device manufacturers — to help track troubled products. That can lead to underreporting, along with missing and flawed data.

Tomes said accurate, complete and publicly accessible data is crucial to identifying problems quickly and making sure devices are safe. The FDA numbers, she said, offer the lowest possible count of reports about problems with breast implants.

“You can assume that the numbers are probably much, much higher,” she said.

A Duke University report funded by the FDA in 2016 found that even though the agency collected data on device malfunctions for more than two decades, “reliably and efficiently tracking the medical device safety and effectiveness outcomes of most interest to patients remains a generally unfulfilled promise” that “significantly affects the public health.”

Insurers, auto buyers and regulators all use a car’s VIN number to track a vehicle’s history, down to the line it was manufactured on at a specific factory, and the FDA’s own pharmaceutical drug oversight works similarly. But medical devices didn’t have a similar unique identifier until 2015, and many of the least-risky devices won’t put an ID into use until 2020. On top of that, experts say it could be years before their use is required in patient records, on insurance claims and in the FDA’s own data.

What are the most common makes and models of breast implants reported as having caused injury? The FDA’s answer is still quite often “Unknown.”

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The FDA requires manufacturers and medical facilities to file a report when any kind of medical device causes serious injury, death or malfunctions.

The resulting database — called MAUDE, for Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience — is available online to the public, so consumers can search for a device type, manufacturer, the details of an incident and the date on which it occurred. That is, if the forms are filled out properly.

But categories often are left blank, with no indication of the model or who submitted the report. And device names and manufacturers also are often misspelled, making it nearly impossible for users to find all the reports of problems with a specific device or company. For example, the data contains roughly 2,000 variations of the name Medtronic plc, one of the world’s largest medical device manufacturers.

Overall, the MAUDE data contains reports of more than 1.7 million injuries and nearly 83,000 deaths over the past 10 years for all types of medical devices, according to an analysis of FDA data by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, which collaborated with the AP on a global investigation of medical device safety.

But in looking at problems with the MAUDE data, the investigation found an additional 2,100 cases in the past five years where people died but their deaths were misclassified as “malfunctions” or “injuries.” Of those, 220 deaths could be directly linked to medical device failure; the other reports did not include enough information to determine conclusively if the device played a role.

Beyond the misclassified data, FDA inspections at 17 hospitals in 2015 and 2016 found that only a fraction of “adverse events” were even being reported anyway. The review —which included major facilities in Los Angeles, New York, Boston and Chicago — found more than half failed to report deaths of patients with medical devices, as required by the agency’s rules. Jeffrey Shuren, the head of the FDA’s device division, said at the time that underreporting problems from hospitals was widespread. The agency enhanced compliance training for hospital employees nationwide as a result.

Part of the problem, advocates say, is that the FDA’s guidelines for reporting problem devices is vague — the agency states that reports are required from manufacturers within 30 days of an event when evidence “reasonably suggests” that a device was involved, allowing companies to make their own judgments.

S. Lori Brown, now a retired FDA senior researcher, used MAUDE for years in her studies of breast implants, ruptures and possible links to rare forms of cancer and a host of autoimmune disorders.

“It’s a difficult database to use, because there’s no good way to confirm what’s reported, and there’s no denominator — you don’t know how many people have received breast implants,” Brown said. “The MAUDE database was just not very helpful in finding out how frequently things happened or how severe the impact was.”

Where it was helpful, she said, was in gathering patient stories and seeing general trends. In the 1990s, even as manufacturers claimed breast implants were durable enough to be run over by a car without breaking, MAUDE showed silicone implants leaking gel into thousands of women’s bodies.

“As a signal, it was a burning bush, for sure,” Brown said. “Because there were so many reports of ruptured implants from every manufacturer.”

After the FDA removed silicone breast implants from the market in 1992, the public attention around ruptures and leaks resulted in a huge spike in the number reports about problems. During the 1990s, silicone implants represented the third-highest number of adverse events reports in MAUDE. At the time, the data show patients also complained about other symptoms, with hundreds of reports about chronic fatigue, headaches, autoimmune problems and fibromyalgia.

In 2006, silicone implants returned to the market, under the requirement that companies track patients for at least a decade. Although more than half the women dropped out of the studies within the first two years, researchers at the University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center in Houston released a study this September using the data the companies did collect and found that certain rare health problems — including immune system and connective tissue disorders — might be more common with silicone gel implants. The FDA, which mandated the original data collection, later criticized the study, citing “inconsistencies in the data.”

Last year, the FDA did confirm a link between breast implants, particularly textured saline or silicone models, and anaplastic large cell lymphoma — a rare cancer documented in only a few hundred cases.

On its website, the FDA also noted more common problems with implants, such as ruptures, which can send silicone gel throughout the body. And the agency warned that implants “are not lifetime devices,” but will likely need to be removed or replaced at some point.

The return of silicone implants, which advocates say feel more natural, has fueled a surge in surgeries. The American Society of Plastic Surgeons reported 400,000 procedures took place in 2017, up nearly 40 percent since 2000.

More than three-quarters of the implant surgeries were for cosmetic, not reconstructive, reasons. And there were about 20 percent fewer removals compared to 2000, the data show.

The increase in implants worries Diana Zuckerman, a medical researcher who was a congressional staffer during the earliest contentious House hearings on breast implant safety. She said poorly performed studies, research funded directly by manufacturers and the lack of data have left most women in the dark about the risks involved.

“Somehow, it’s the most studied device and we have almost no useful information about it,” said Zuckerman, the president of the National Center for Health Research, a nonprofit think tank that performs its own research, assesses the quality of others’ research and works with patients.

Zuckerman’s center reviewed more than 20 studies it says has been used by the industry to claim there is no evidence breast implants cause connective tissue problems and other long-term illnesses. She said almost all the studies were too small to detect rare diseases and conditions, only one required that participants have a medical exam and most didn’t focus on patients who had implants long enough for problems to develop.

In September, Cook and 19 other breast implant patients-turned-health-advocates visited Washington to lobby the FDA for more stringent regulation, testing and reporting on breast implants. Among their requests — that all types of textured implants, which are more closely associated with lymphoma, be banned from the market, and that manufacturers be required to disclose the chemicals in silicone implants’ shell and gel filling, which the makers claim is a trade secret.

The FDA has scheduled an advisory committee hearing for early 2019 on breast implant safety to address some of the U.S. group’s concerns and determine whether additional actions are needed to protect public health. The agency did not rule out the possibility of including a “black box warning,” the notification it puts on its most dangerous devices to draw attention to serious risks.

However, the FDA said in a statement: “The agency continues to believe that the weight of the currently available scientific evidence does not conclusively demonstrate an association between breast implants and connective tissue diseases.”

Cook, who leads several breast implant groups on Facebook from her home near Dallas, said she chose to get her implants, but did so with almost no information on the potential dangers.

“If you had sat down with me and said ‘this is the list of chemicals you’re about to put in your body and you could get lymphoma,’ no way in hell I would have done it,” she said.

Her implants, a textured saline model made by Poly Implant Prothese of France, were used in the U.S. for four years before the FDA implemented more stringent standards for breast implant approval in 2000. Under the new rules, the FDA denied the company’s application to sell implants in the U.S. after officials toured the company’s French plant and cited 11 major deficiencies in quality control and manufacturing practices.

Poly Implant went bankrupt in 2010 after doctors in France noted abnormally high rupture rates of the implants, which were found to be filled with industrial-grade gel. The company’s president was found guilty of aggravated fraud, and French authorities advised tens of thousands of women to get their implants removed as a precautionary measure.

Cook, 41, said she and others who already had the saline implants never were warned of the FDA’s actions.

“I’m not going to sit back and be embarrassed about my decision when I can try to change the way that the future is going to occur for women younger than me,” she said. “We need to make sure we’re giving that patient the most safe device we possibly can. And above that, we need to make sure she understands what the risks are before she makes that choice.”

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The FDA may now require an identifying number on medical devices, but Zuckerman and other advocates note one big issue with the code associated with breast implants: The number is not actually stamped on the implant itself, but on the packaging.

“For the most part, these devices don’t cause immediate problems — they cause problems later,” Zuckerman said. “What good does it do to have these numbers if they’re not in your medical records and they aren’t on the implant itself?”

The unique device identifier, or UDI, is intended to help standardize device names and manufacturer information and make it easier to track devices to help in recall efforts and analyses of problems.

But that doesn’t work if the codes aren’t in the FDA’s own database. Tomes, whose company Device Events analyzes MAUDE data, said UDIs are still rarely included in adverse event reports and, even when they are, often are removed from the public data so they can’t be used to identify specific devices.

“The whole point of having a UDI is so that hospitals and providers and insurance companies and anyone else would be able to say ‘I’m seeing a pattern, it’s all this serial number,’” Tomes said. “But it’s redacted.”

Similarly, Tomes and others say the FDA’s expansion of summary reporting and its use of device registries — databases funded and maintained by outside organizations to track a singular specific device — may ultimately make less data available to consumers.

This fall, the agency announced a breast implant registry run through the Plastic Surgery Foundation that will collect patient and device data — including UDI numbers for breast implants — and allow surgeons to track patients’ medical history, complications and follow-up surgeries.

The participation of plastic surgeons in the registry is voluntary, and patients also can opt out. Doctors and researchers will have access to the collected data, but the public will not.

As the FDA weighed its expansion of the summary reporting program earlier this year, Cook and a dozen other patients with medical device problems, along with the patient-advocacy group Public Citizen, urged the agency to rethink its plan.

But the FDA sided with manufacturers and industry organizations, which had asked for easier reporting requirements for malfunctions, freeing them in some cases from filing tens of thousands of individual reports a year. Under the new rules now in place, roughly 90 percent of devices can report malfunctions quarterly.

“Thousands on thousands of consumers are harmed every single year by medical devices and we are discussing making it easier to hide the information that we need to make an informed decision,” Cook wrote in her dissent to the plan.

“While the goal is not to ‘hide’ the data,” she wrote, “in essence that is what is happening.”

 

See the original story here.